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Abstract 
We reexamine the stock price drifts following open-market stock repurchase 
announcements by differentiating actual repurchases from repurchase announcements and by 
controlling for the repurchasing firms’ earnings improvement in the announcement year relative 
to the prior year. Our results show that only firms that actually repurchase their shares exhibit a 
positive post-announcement drift. More importantly, we find that these repurchasing firms have 
the same post-announcement drift as their matching firms that have similar size and earnings 
performance but do not repurchase. Further analysis indicates that the post-repurchase 
announcement drift is not a distinct anomaly but the well-documented post-earnings 
announcement drift in disguise. In addition, previous studies suggest that the market perceives 
IPOs as bad news (i.e., competitive threats) to existing firms in the same industry. At the same 
time, the market has a tendency to be overly optimistic about IPO prospects, especially during hot 
IPO markets. Thus, the negative industry rival reaction could be the result of investors’ over-
optimism toward the IPOs’ growth prospects and underestimation of the competitive positions of 
industry rivals. Our findings show that rival firms use repurchases as a means to signal their firm 
quality, as well as to correct the market’s overreaction to the bad news. These IPO-induced 
repurchases are stronger when the rival firms are in a concentrated industry and experienced poor 
stock performance in the previous year.  
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The Post Repurchase Announcement Drift: An Anomaly in Disguise? 
 
1. Introduction. 
Numerous studies have provided evidence of long-term return anomalies following 
important corporate events1. In particular, some studies find that the stock market slowly reacts to 
information delivered by certain corporate events, leading to abnormal returns up to five years 
following major corporate events. This observation strongly challenges the informational 
efficiency of stock markets. 
However, Fama (1998) argues that these anomalies are chance results, or due to incorrect 
methodologies such as incorrect statistical methods and bad model problems. As a result, most 
long-term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in methodologies or with 
out-of-sample tests. Schwert (2003) further reviews anomalies and concludes that they seem to 
have disappeared in recent years. Along similar lines, Liu, Szewczyk, and Zantout (2008) report 
that after controlling for the earnings announcement drift, there is no evidence of price drift 
following dividend reductions or dividend omission announcements. In particular, Liu et al. (2008) 
argue that earnings performance and dividend payout are positively related to each other, and 
dividend reductions or omissions might be the result of a firm’s earnings deterioration. As 
predicted, they find that, on average, the dividend reduction or omission firms actually do not 
                                                 
1 For example, self-tender offer (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990), stock repurchase (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen, 1995; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2008), mergers (Agrawal, Jaffe and Gershon, 1992), spinoffs (Cusatis, Miles 
and Woolridge 1993), dividend initiation and omission (Michaely, Thaler and Womack 1995), new exchange listings 
(Drahan and Ikenberry, 1995), earnings announcement (Bernard and Thomas, 1990), and IPOs (Loughran and Ritter, 
1995, Chan, Kalok, Junbo, Wang, John Wei, 2004). 
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underperform their benchmark firms that have a similar level of earnings deterioration in the 
announcement year. Their conclusion is that the observed price drift following dividend reduction 
or omission announcements is actually driven by the earnings announcement price drift first found 
by Ball and Brown (1968) and later confirmed by Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996). 
Motivated by their interesting findings, this paper reexamines the stock price drift 
following open-market stock repurchase announcements first found by Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995) (hereafter ILV). In particular, ILV (1995) find that the market underreacts to 
information conveyed by the repurchase announcements. This underreaction leads to an average 
of 12.1% (45.3% for ‘value’ stocks) buy-and-hold abnormal return for four years after repurchase 
announcements. Chan, Ikenberry, Lee (2004, 2007) attribute the positive long-run abnormal 
returns following repurchase announcements to the market’s incomplete initial reaction to the 
earnings information conveyed by the repurchase announcements and to the managers’ market 
timing skills. On the other hand, Peyer and Vermaelen (2008) argue that the drift is a correction of 
the market’s overreaction to bad news prior to the repurchase. 
The finding by Liu et al. (2008) that the post-dividend announcement drift is actually driven 
by the post-earnings announcement drift leads us to question the existence of the repurchase drift. 
Specifically, we want to examine whether the post-earnings announcement drift is also an 
underlying force behind the repurchase drift. Previous studies find evidence of a strong connection 
between repurchase activities and earnings performance. In particular, Skinner (2008) finds that 
repurchases have become substitutes for cash dividends and increasingly absorb the variation in 
earnings. In addition, he notes that the relation between earnings performance and repurchases is 
getting stronger, while the relation between earnings performance and dividend has become 
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weaker. Vermaelen (1981), Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) and Bartov (1991), among others, 
find significant earnings improvement in the repurchase announcement year and less improvement 
in the two years after. Moreover, Lie (2005) distinguishes actual repurchases from repurchase 
announcements and concludes that only firms that actually buyback their stock experience 
earnings improvement. Similarly, Yook (2010) looks at stock performance and finds that only 
actual repurchase firms exhibit positive post-announcement abnormal returns. Taken together, the 
above evidence suggests that repurchase announcements, especially actual repurchases, are 
associated with earnings improvement and this association is more profound in the announcement 
year. This connection leads us to conjecture that the repurchase drift is not a distinct anomaly but 
the earnings drift in disguise. To our knowledge, none of the previous studies consider this 
alternative explanation when examining the repurchase drift.  
While dividends and repurchases are widely viewed as alternative payout methods, the 
motivations behind these two different types of payout can differ significantly. Thus, we cannot 
simply infer that the earnings announcement drift also drives the repurchase announcement drift. 
For example, repurchases are often used for non-payout reasons such as signaling undervaluation, 
manipulating EPS, optimizing capital structure, offsetting the dilutive effects of stock option 
exercises, and exploiting tax advantages, among others. In addition, compared to dividends, 
repurchases are notoriously known for a lack of commitment, giving managers considerable 
flexibility in determining when and how many stocks they are going to repurchase. Moreover, 
repurchase announcements are followed by a positive drift, while dividend reduction/omission 
announcements are followed by a negative drift. Thus, the underlying explanations behind the 
dividend omission drift and the repurchase drift may not be the same. 
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In this study, we first document the existence of the repurchase drift for the group of firms 
that actually buyback their stocks, and then we examine if this drift still exists after taking into 
account the effect of the earnings drift. In particular, we examine 6,311 repurchase announcements 
from 1988 to 2010. Our results from the calendar-time approach with Fama-French three factors 
confirm the existence of a positive drift following repurchase announcements made by the actual 
repurchasing firms. Specifically, the average monthly abnormal return of these repurchasing firms 
is 0.314% or 17.21% for four years after the announcement. On the other hand, we do not observe 
any drift following the announcements made by the non-repurchasing firms, consistent with Yook 
(2010). Similarly, we also find the drift for the actual repurchasing firms using the matching 
method based on common benchmarks such as Size, Size-Industry, Size-B/M, and Size and Past 
Performance. Specifically, the four-year buy-and-hold abnormal return ranges from 13.6% to 
25.7%, depending on the matching criteria. However, the drift becomes smaller and less significant 
when matching by pre-announcement earnings performance (Earningsand disappears when 
matching by both Size and Earnings. These findings are not confined to any particular sub-
periods, such as the bubble or financial crisis years, nor are they limited to any particular terciles 
based on Size, B/M, past performance, or Earnings. As a robustness check, we subtract the 
monthly return of the matching firm based on Size and Earnings from the monthly return of the 
repurchasing firm and then estimate the average monthly abnormal return using the calendar-time 
approach. The results show that all the alphas are insignificant, meaning there is no drift following 
repurchase announcements after simultaneously controlling for the effects of Size, B/M and 
Earnings  
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we shed light on 
whether the well-documented repurchase announcement drift is a distinct anomaly or just the 
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earnings announcement drift in disguise. Second, we document that the earnings change in the 
repurchase announcement year is a significant determinant of the post-repurchase performance, 
distinct from other previously known factors such as firm size, book-to-market, past stock 
performance, or market risk change. Third, our findings have implications for other types of 
documented long-run anomalies that may appear to exist only due to the lack of proper controls.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the sample 
selection and statistical description. Section III examines the post-announcement long-term 
abnormal stock return. Section IV presents robustness checks. Section V shows the cross-sectional 
regression analysis. Section VI presents the conclusions. 
2. Sample Selection and Description. 
We obtain the sample of open market stock repurchase announcements from the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database. Our sample of repurchase 
announcements span from January 1988 through December 2010. The sample excludes repurchase 
announcements from utilities and financial firms and deal values less than one million dollars. If 
a firm has more than one announcement in one year, we only retain the first announcement since 
the subsequent announcements are more likely duplicate announcements. Repurchase firms need 
to have data for computing returns at least one year after the announcement (Center for Research 
in Security Prices) and have sufficient data for accounting variables (from Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat). Our final sample has 6,311 repurchase announcements from 2,854 firms.  
Following Yook (2010), we divide the repurchase announcement sample into repurchasing 
firms and non-repurchasing firms based on the actual repurchases made from the announcement 
quarter through quarter t+4. Repurchases in each fiscal quarter are computed as Compustat data 
item PRSTKCY (purchase of common and preferred stock) less any decrease in preferred stock. 
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Since PRDTKCY is a year-to-date item, we need to convert it to quarterly repurchases. 
Specifically, each quarterly repurchase, except the first quarter of the fiscal year, is equal to the 
PRDTKCY of the current quarter minus the PRDTKCY of the previous quarter. Preferred stock is 
estimated as, in order of preference, data item PSTKCY (redemption value), item PSTKL 
(liquidating value), or item PSTK (carrying value). We then obtain the total repurchases for the 1-
year period as the sum of repurchases from the announcement quarter t to quarter t+4. If a firm’s 
total repurchases for the 1-year period are positive, we define the firm as a repurchasing firm, and 
as a non-repurchasing firm otherwise.  
In Table 1, we present the distribution of the sample repurchase announcements by 
calendar years and by subsamples based on actual repurchases over a 1-year period. The annual 
distribution of repurchase announcements is uneven throughout the sample period. In particular, 
more repurchase announcements occur in the late 1990s than in other periods. Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000) previously highlight this surge in repurchase activity, noting that in 1998, for the 
first time in the history, U.S. corporations distributed more cash to investors through repurchases 
than through cash dividends.  
According to our definition of actual repurchases, 4,603 repurchase announcement firms 
(or 72.9% of the entire sample) are considered repurchasing firms, consistent with Yook (2010). 
We see more firms classified as repurchasing firms since 2000. In 2008, 463 (7.3%) 
announcements were made, but only 65% actually repurchased their stock.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of repurchase announcement 
firms as well as for the two subsamples defined by actual repurchases. Size is measured as the 
market value of equity in the month prior to the repurchase announcement. On average, the 
repurchasing firms are larger than non-repurchasing firms. The repurchasing firms also have a 
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higher B/M value of equity ratio than that of the non-repurchasing firms, suggesting that 
repurchasing firms are more undervalued compared to the non-repurchasing firms. This is intuitive 
and consistent with the most cited reason for repurchase, which is undervaluation. Earnings is 
the percentage change in earnings before extraordinary items (IB in COMPUSTAT) in the 
announcement year relative to the prior year. Table 2 shows that, on average, repurchasing firms 
exhibit higher Earnings in the announcement year compared to non-repurchasing firms. 
Performance is measured as the monthly compounded return for 12 months prior to the repurchase 
announcement month. The mean prior return of repurchasing firms is 9%, as compared to 11% for 
non-repurchasing firms. Peyer and Vermaelen (2007) find that the pre-announcement performance 
of repurchasing firms is negatively related to the post-announcement returns.  
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that repurchasing firms experience a decrease in 
systematic risk after repurchase announcements. We measure the change in systematic risk 
(Riskas the beta estimate for the [+30, +250] window minus the beta estimate for the [-250, -
30] window using the market model. We observe an average decrease of 0.09 and 0.10 in the 
systematic risk for repurchasing firms and for non-repurchasing firms, respectively. Real_RP is a 
dummy variable which receives a value of one if the firm actually repurchases stock and zero 
otherwise. As shown previously in Table 1, 73% of the firms that announce repurchases actually 
proceed with implementing the repurchase. The three-day Car [-1, +1] around the repurchase 
announcement is 2%, consistent with previous studies.  
3. Long-term Abnormal Returns after Repurchase Announcements. 
a. Long-term abnormal stock returns using the calendar-time methodology. 
We use the calendar-time method to compute the long-run abnormal returns following 
repurchase announcements for the entire sample of repurchase announcement firms and for two 
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subsamples defined by the actual repurchase. The calendar-time portfolio method is recommended 
by Fama (1998) and has been broadly used in long-term event studies such as Loughran and Ritter 
(1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), Boehme and Sorescu (2002), and Liu et al. (2008). For every 
month, we calculate the equally weighted returns for the portfolio of all firms that made a stock 
repurchase announcement during the preceding 12, 24, 36 or 48 calendar months. Then, we 
estimate the portfolio’s monthly abnormal returns (αp) using the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model as follows: 
Rp,t − Rf,t = αp + βp (Rm,t − Rf,t ) + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + ep,t 
where Rp,t is the return of the event portfolio in month t; Rf,t is the 1-month U.S. Treasury bill rate 
in month t; Rm,t is the return on the value-weighted index of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
listed stocks in month t; SMBt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big 
stocks in month t; and HMLt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high and low 
B/M value of equity ratio in month t. The intercept αp is the monthly abnormal return of the event 
portfolio of 12, 24, 36, or 48 months.  
The results from the calendar-time approach with Fama-French three factors confirm the 
existence of positive abnormal returns following repurchase announcements for the entire sample 
of repurchase announcement firms. In particular, based on the Fama-French three-factor model, 
the average monthly abnormal return for one, two, three, and four years after the announcement is 
0.312% (significant at the 5% level), 0.327%, 0.315%, and 0.306% (all significant at the 1%), 
respectively. However, as expected, these results are strongly driven by the subsample of firms 
that actually repurchase. The average monthly abnormal returns of the repurchasing firms are 
similar to those of the entire sample in terms of magnitude and level of significance. On the other 
hand, the intercept for the subsample of non-repurchasing firms is not significant in any of the 
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periods. This evidence is consistent with findings by Yook (2010) that only firms with actual 
repurchases show positive abnormal returns following the announcements. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of a four factor model, including the momentum factor 
suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). When including the momentum factor, the monthly 
abnormal returns of the repurchasing firms become even larger and more significant. Specifically, 
the average monthly abnormal return over the 4 years following the announcement for 
repurchasing firms is 0.50% (significant at 1% level), or 27% monthly compounded for 4 years. 
The monthly abnormal returns for non-repurchasing firms are not significant for all durations.  
b. Buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns using the matching method. 
The abnormal performance of repurchase announcement firms is measured as the mean 
difference in the stock price performance between the repurchase announcement firms and the 
matching firms over buy-and-hold periods that extend from 1 to 4 years following the 
announcement. The non-event benchmark firms are chosen using the following matching criteria: 
(1) firm size, which is measured as the market value of equity in the month prior to the repurchase 
announcement; (2) firm size and industry, based on the two digit SIC code from the CRSP 
database; (3) size and book to market value of equity (B/M is measured as of the end of the fiscal 
year prior to the announcement date); (4) size and performance (performance is measured as the 
monthly compounded return in the 12 months prior to the repurchase announcement month); (5) 
earnings, which is the percentage change in earnings before extraordinary items (IB in 
COMPUSTAT) in the announcement year relative to the prior year; and (6) size and Earnings. 
In matching by size (by Earnings), we require that the size (Earnings) of the matching firm be 
between 60% and 140% of the market value of equity (Earnings) of the repurchase announcement 
firms. For matching by size and B/M, we select the matching firm which has the smallest difference 
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in B/M from all firms which have size between 60% and 140% of the market value of equity of 
the repurchase announcement firms. Similar procedures are applied for matching by size and 
performance, and by size and Earnings. If a matching firm is delisted, we replace it by the next-
best matching firm. The matching firms cannot have any repurchase announcements 4 years before 
to 4 years after the event year. 
Table 4 summarizes the outcome of our procedure for matching the repurchase 
announcement firms with non-repurchase matching firms based on the four matching criteria 
above. For each matching criteria, the event firms and the matching firms are very close, by design. 
On average, when not matched by Earnings, the repurchase firms have higher earnings 
performance than their matching firms 
After matching the repurchase announcement firms with their benchmark firms, we follow 
Barber and Lyon (1997) in computing the holding period abnormal return for a firm as: 
BHAR(i,a,b)=∏ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 1)𝑏𝑡=𝑎 -∏ (𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 1)
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎 ,where BHAR(i,a,b) is the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return for event firm i over the holding period from a to b, Rit is the return on stock i in month t, 
and Rmt is the return on the matching firm in month t. The buy-and-hold average abnormal returns 
(BHAAR) are measured from 12 months up to 48 months following the announcement. If an event 
firm is delisted before the end of a holding period, we keep its returns and replace the missing 
values by the matching firm’s returns. The BHAR is winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. We 
use both t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to determine statistical significance. 
Table 5 presents the results of the buy-and-hold method matching by different criteria. 
When controlling for firm size, size and industry affiliation, size and B/M, or size and past 
performance, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive and significant for the entire sample 
and for the subsample of repurchasing firms. Specifically, the average four year buy-and-hold 
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abnormal return for the repurchasing firms is in a range of 13.6% to 25.7% and is strongly 
significant at the 1% level in both parametric t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon tests. This result 
confirms the appearance of a positive post-repurchase announcement drift found by our calendar-
time approach in the previous section, as well as in the prior repurchase literature. However, when 
we control for the earnings change effect, the average abnormal return for repurchasing firms 
becomes smaller and less significant. Specifically, when controlling for earnings change only, the 
average four year buy-and-hold abnormal return is around 8% for the entire sample and 15% for 
the subsample of repurchasing firms, both significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, when we 
control for the combination effect of size and earnings change, the abnormal returns are small and 
insignificant for the entire sample as well as for the subsample of repurchasing firms. Thus, these 
results indicate that controlling for both size and earnings performance is a key in understanding 
post-repurchase performance.  
Throughout our analysis, the post-repurchase announcement drift observed from the 
calendar-time method and from the matching method based on non-earnings related criteria is 
significantly weakened when using a matching method based on Earnings. Previous studies show 
that repurchases are associated with improvement in earnings performance in the announcement 
quarter, and up to 8 quarters following the announcements (Bartov (1991), Chan et al. (2004), Lie 
(2005), Gong et al. (2008)). Thus, our findings suggest that the post-repurchase announcement 
drift using the calendar-time method and matching methods based on non-earnings related criteria 
may be the post-earnings announcement price drift first found by Ball and Brown (1968) and 
confirmed by Bernard and Thomas (1990), and Chan et al. (1996). Our result indicates that firms 
that repurchase their stock have the same post-event returns as firms that have similar size and 
earnings performance but do not repurchase their stocks. 
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4. Robustness Tests. 
The association between the repurchase drift and earnings performance might be confined 
to a specific period or significantly influenced by macro-economic conditions such as the bubble 
years (1999-2001) or financial crisis years (2007-2009). In order to address these concerns, we 
divide our sample period into sub-periods, 1988-2000; 2001-2010 and a sub-period without the 
bubble years and crisis years. We then reapply the calendar-time method and the matching method 
to estimate the post announcement abnormal returns for repurchasing firms during the three sub-
periods. The reason we focus on the group of repurchasing firms is that only this group exhibits 
positive drift after the announcements.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows the average monthly abnormal returns for repurchasing firms 
using the calendar-time method. Although the magnitude of the abnormal returns is higher during 
the 2001 through 2010 period, all three sub-periods show statistically significant positive drift. 
Panel B presents the results of the matching method. A similar conclusion can be made for 
each sub-period as in the case for the entire sample period shown in Table 5. In particular, after 
controlling for the size effect and earnings performance effect, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
are insignificant in the sub-periods, suggesting that there is no independent repurchase drift.  
Previous studies document that the long-run abnormal returns following repurchase 
announcements are driven by small firms, by “value” firms, or by firms with poor performance in 
the year prior to the announcement year (ILV (1990, 1995); Peyer and Vermaelen (2008), Bradford 
(2008), and Yook (2010), among others). To examine whether our previous conclusion on earnings 
performance and repurchase drift is confined to any particular group of repurchasing firms, we 
further stratify the sub-sample of repurchasing firms based on size terciles, B/M terciles, 
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performance terciles, and Earnings terciles and then reapply the calendar-time method and the 
matching method based on size and Earnings for each tercile. 2 
As shown in Table 7, the small firm tercile has the largest average monthly abnormal return 
compared to the medium and large size terciles. In particular, the average monthly abnormal return 
for 4 years is 0.823%, 0.374% and 0.233% for the small, medium, and large size terciles, 
respectively. This result is consistent with the findings from previous studies which document that 
price drift is more profound in small firms. However, the result of the matching method by size 
and earnings shows that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are insignificant for all size terciles. 
Similarly, for the B/M terciles, the high B/M tercile, or the “value” firm tercile, experiences the 
largest abnormal return when using the calendar-time approach. However, the result from the 
matching method shows that the abnormal return disappears for all B/M terciles when controlling 
for the size and earnings performance of repurchasing firms.  
We also divide the repurchase firms based on their pre-repurchase performance, based on 
Peyer and Vermaelen’s (2007) observation that prior performance is negatively related to post-
announcement repurchase performance. Our evidence supports their findings. In particular, the 
monthly abnormal return for 4 years for low, medium and high performance terciles is 0.377%, 
0.154%, and 0.313%, respectively. Again, after controlling for size and earnings, the buy-and-hold 
returns become insignificant for all terciles. Finally, for the earnings terciles, the high earnings 
tercile seems to have higher abnormal returns using the calendar-time approach, but abnormal 
                                                 
2 We put firms into size terciles based on their sizes relative to the sizes of all Compustat/CRSP firms in the 
month prior to the announcement month. Similarly, firms are put into B/M terciles based on the B/M ratio at the fiscal 
year-end prior to the announcement relative to the B/M ratio of all Compustat firms. A firm’s performance tercile is 
based on their performance (measured as monthly compounded returns for 12 month prior to the announcement 
months) relative to all firms in that month. Firms are divided into Earnings terciles based on their Earnings 
(measured as the percentage change in earnings before extraordinary items (IB in COMPUSTAT) of the 
announcement year relative to the prior year) relative to all firms in that month. 
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returns are all insignificant across the earnings terciles using the matching method by size and 
earnings. Overall, our conclusion above that the post-repurchase announcement drift is driven by 
the post-earnings announcement drift holds for all repurchasing firms regardless of its size, B/M, 
performance, or earnings. 
As another robustness check of the role of earnings performance in explaining the post-
repurchase announcement drift, we reapply the calendar method with the Fama-French three 
factors after controlling for the earnings performance effect. The motivation for this test is that the 
calendar-time approach, unlike the matching method using earnings performance, does not control 
for the earnings performance of the event firms. As our previous evidence shows, we need to 
control for earnings performance to see whether the post-repurchase announcement drift is not 
actually the post-earnings announcement drift. In particular, following Liu et al. (2008), we 
compute the excess monthly returns by subtracting returns of matching firms based on earnings 
from returns of the repurchase event firms. We then create a rolling portfolio using the excess 
monthly returns and use the Fama-French three-factor model to estimate the abnormal return on 
the portfolio. As shown in Table 8, after controlling for the earnings performance of repurchase 
firms, we find no evidence of significant abnormal returns for all durations. This finding supports 
our conclusion that the post-repurchase announcement drift is actually driven by the post-earnings 
announcement drift based on matching methods as well as calendar-time methodology. 
The empirical evidence so far indicates the importance of taking into account the firm’s 
earnings performance in the announcement year in order to examine whether the post-repurchase 
announcement drift is a distinct anomaly. In the next step, we examine the role of earnings 
performance in determining the post-repurchase announcement abnormal returns together with 
other factors that have been documented as significant determinants of the post-repurchase 
16 
 
announcement abnormal returns. In particular, we run a cross-sectional regression of the size 
adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns for one through four years (BHARi, i=1,2,3,4) after 
repurchase announcement on earnings performance, Earnings, the actual repurchase dummy, 
and other well-documented determinants including size, book-to-market, prior year return, 
systematic risk changes, and market returns. We control for changes in macro-economic condition 
by including the adjusted market return. We run the following cross-sectional regressions for 
BHAR1 through BHAR4. 
For columns (1), (3), (5), and (7): 
BHARi=Intercept + β1Earningsi + β2Real_RPi+ β3AdjSizei + β4B/Mi + β5Performancei + β6 
Riski + β7Marketi + e. 
 
For columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) we add the interaction term between Earnings and Real_RP 
dummy: 
BHARi=Intercept + β1Earningsi + β2EarningsicReal_RPi + β3Real_RPi + β4AdjSizei + 
β5B/Mi + β6Performancei + β7Riski + β8Marketi + e.  
 
Table 9 shows that the coefficients of the Earnings  variable are positive and significant 
for all regressions even after controlling for other relevant factors. This finding supports our 
argument that earnings performance in the announcement year plays a role in the post-
announcement stock performance. This finding is also consistent with the logic that the market 
underreacts to the earnings improvement in the announcement year, leading to a post-earnings 
announcement drift. Except for the market variable, which is insignificant, the other independent 
variables are significant and have the expected signs. In particular, real repurchases are associated 
with higher long-run abnormal returns. Small firms, “value” firm, and firms with poor past 
performance are more likely to be undervalued and exhibit a positive abnormal return in the post-
announcement periods.  
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The coefficients of the interaction term are positive and significant, except for in model 
(8). These findings suggest that firms that experience an increase in earnings performance in the 
announcement year and actually repurchase shares in the 1-year period following the 
announcement exhibit larger long-run abnormal returns. In sum, our results indicate that, in 
addition to other well-known factors such as size and book-to-market, earnings performance and 
actual repurchase activity are two important factors in explaining abnormal returns following-
repurchase announcements. 
5. Conclusion.  
Fama and French (2001) show that in recent years more firms have chosen to distribute 
earnings increases through repurchases. Also, Skinner (2008) reports that the relation between 
repurchases and earnings performance has become stronger while the relation between dividends 
and earnings performance has become weaker. In addition to this evidence, numerous studies 
document an improvement in earnings following repurchase announcements of firms that actually 
buy back their stock (Dann et al. (1991), Bartov (1991), Lie (2005) among others). Thus, it is 
possible that the post-repurchase announcement drift might be a result of the market’s 
underreaction to the earnings improvement in the repurchase announcement year. In other words, 
the post-repurchase announcement drift might be driven by the well-known post-earnings 
announcement price drift. 
This paper reexamines the post-repurchase announcement drift found by Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) by differentiating actual repurchases from repurchase 
announcements and by taking into account the repurchasing firms’ earnings improvement in the 
announcement year relative to the prior year.  
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Using both the calendar-time approach and the matching approach with buy-and-hold 
return methodology, we find that only firms that actually repurchase their stocks exhibit post-
announcement price drift, consistent with Yook (2010). More importantly, we find that these 
repurchasing firms show similar post-announcement returns as their matching firms that have 
similar size and earnings performance but do not repurchase. This evidence supports our argument 
that the post-repurchase announcement drift is not a distinct anomaly but is actually the well-
documented post-earnings announcement drift found by Ball and Brown (1968) and Ball and 
Brown (1968) and recently confirmed by Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok (1996). 
This conclusion is not limited to any specific subperiod, or to bubble or crisis years, nor is 
it driven by any specific group of firms based on characteristics such as size, B/M, prior year stock 
performance, or earnings performance. The percentage change in earnings from the repurchase 
announcement year relative to the prior year, along with firm size, play a key role in explaining 
the post-repurchase announcement performance. These findings suggest that the well-documented 
repurchase drift is actually the post-earnings announcement drift in disguise.  
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Intra Industry Effects of IPOs on Stock Repurchase Decisions 
 
1. Introduction 
Prior research has observed that IPOs may pose a competitive threat for rival firms in the 
same industry. In particular, Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2010) find that rival firms experience 
negative stock price reactions to completed IPOs in their industries, equivalent to an average loss 
of -$3.27 million for an incumbent firm around the IPO event. New IPOs prompt investors to 
reevaluate the competitive conditions in the industry and to recognize the possible competitive 
advantages possessed by the newly-public firm. As Hsu et al. note, these advantages for newly-
public firms may include the improved access to financing, their recent certification by 
underwriters, and their valuable knowledge capital, in comparison with incumbent firms. In line 
with this logic, empirical evidence by Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) shows that rival firms 
suffer a negative CAR of -0.93% during the two day window of an IPO announcement in the same 
industry. Akhibe, Borde, and Whyte (2003) also find evidence of the negative impact of IPOs on 
industry rivals for large IPOs in competitive industries.3 In further support of the competitive 
effects of IPOs, Hsu et al. find that the operating performance of industry rivals declines following 
a large IPO in the industry. 
While the market may view IPO firms as strong new competitors in the industry, ample 
evidence suggests that investors tend to be overly enthusiastic about the growth prospects of 
                                                 
3 In examining all IPOs, both large and small, Akhibe et al. (2003) do not find a general valuation effect for industry 
rivals in response to IPOs. 
20 
 
newly-public firms, especially during hot IPOs markets.4 Specifically, previous studies find 
evidence consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis. Ritter (1991) suggests two possible 
explanations for IPO misvaluation, and the subsequent long-run underperformance of IPOs: 
Investors tend to be overly optimistic about the future expected earnings of young growth firms 
during IPO periods, and firms capitalize on these “windows of opportunity”. Similarly, Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) argue that investors might give high valuations to IPOs at the time of going 
public because they “believe that they have identified the next Microsoft.” Ritter and Welch (2002) 
also find empirical evidence that IPOs are overpriced on the first day and have poor stock 
performance in the long-run. Over three years, the average IPO underperformed the market by 
23.4 percent and underperformed size and book-to-market matched firms by 5.1 percent. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) provide evidence that IPOs were about 14% to 50% 
overvalued at the offer price compared to their industry peers. They argue that the overvaluation 
is caused by IPO investors paying too much attention to optimistic growth forecasts and too little 
attention to current profitability in their assessment of IPO value.  
Given the often overly optimistic market sentiment towards IPOs and the negative market 
inferences regarding rival firms’ diminished competitive positions, rival firm managers may 
believe the damage to their stock price is unwarranted. These rival firms may choose to use 
repurchases as a means to signal firm-quality and to correct the market’s overreaction to the bad 
news (i.e., the competitive threat caused by the IPO), especially during hot IPO markets. In line 
with this logic, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) argue that stock repurchases may be the firm’s 
response to investors’ overreaction to analysts’ downgrade recommendations during the 6 months 
prior to the repurchase announcement. Dudley and Manakyan (2011) further provide evidence that 
                                                 
4 For example, see Ritter, 1991, Loughran and Ritter, 1995, Jain and Kini, 1994, Mikkelson and Shah, 1994, and 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), among others. 
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firms use stock repurchases in order to support their stock prices due to widespread selling by 
mutual funds experiencing large capital outflows. Vermaelen (1981) concludes that “…repurchase 
announcements make the market more efficient by allowing firms to correct mispricing of their 
securities”.  
Our results show that rival firms increase their repurchases in the presence of the incoming 
competitive threat from IPOs. In particular, tobit models show that a rival firm increases its share 
repurchase volume by around 15%, on average, when faced by the competitive effects of IPOs in 
the same industry. Moreover, if the firm has experienced poor stock performance in the previous 
year and is in a concentrated industry, its repurchase volume increases by about 29.2%. The results 
of probit models show that the repurchase probability of a rival firm increases by about 11.1%, on 
average, during IPO waves in the industry. The probability of repurchase increases to about 37.1% 
for poorly performing rival firms in high concentration industries.  
Overall, this paper contributes to several different streams of literature. First, the results 
highlight a new motivation behind the repurchase decision. In particular, the evidence shows that 
firms strategically use repurchases to support their stock prices in the presence of the perceived 
competitive threat caused by large number of IPOs in the industry. The effects are stronger for 
rival firms with poor stock performance in the previous year and those in concentrated industries. 
The effects are independent of economic conditions and not driven by the internet bubble years. 
Second, the findings highlight a previously unrecognized link between two different corporate 
events, IPOs and repurchases. Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature examining the 
intra-industry effects of corporate decisions by not only examining the stock price impact on rivals, 
but also the impact on rival firm decisions. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a brief literature review 
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on motivations for stock repurchases. Section 3 presents descriptions of sample data and variables. 
Section 4 includes summary statistics and univariate tests. Section 5 presents results of tobit and 
probit regressions and robustness checks. A brief conclusion follows. 
2. Motivations for Stock Repurchases. 
Why do firms buy back their stock? The literature has presented a long list of motivations 
to answer the question, and the reasons are not mutually exclusive. Given the many dimensions 
of the repurchase decision, this list is likely not complete. Nevertheless, the following discussion 
reviews the most common reasons for stock repurchases. 
Agency cost of free cash flow hypothesis:  
Because of the separation between ownership and control in large corporations, managers 
of firms which have unnecessarily high free cash flows might pursue sub-optimal projects at the 
expense of shareholders. The market will impose an agency cost on these firms. Managers of these 
firms might mitigate the agency cost problem by paying out excess cash through stock repurchase 
or dividend (Jensen, 1986). Stephen and Weisbach (1998) find that stock repurchase is positively 
related to both expected and unexpected cash flows, and Dittmar (2000) also finds a connection 
between repurchases and excess cash. Grullon and Michaely (2004) find evidence that the market 
reaction to repurchase announcements is more positive for those firms that are more likely to 
overinvest, consistent with the prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Cash flow signaling hypothesis.  
Managers might have some positive information about their firms’ future earnings that 
may not be available to the public. Because of this information asymmetry, stock prices of those 
firms might be undervalued. The managers of these firms might send a credible signal of their 
optimism about the firms’ earnings prospects by paying out through a dividend or repurchase 
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program (e.g., Vermaelen, 1981; Miller and Rock, 1985 among others.) Bartov (1991) finds there 
are positive unexpected annual earnings in the repurchase announcement year, and analysts 
upwardly revise the earnings forecast at the repurchase announcement dates. On the contrary, 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) use a much larger sample and find no evidence that analysts revise 
their earnings forecasts upward around the repurchase announcements and only a weak evidence 
of earnings improvements during the announcement year. In comparing the post-event operating 
performance of repurchasing firms with that of non-repurchasing firms with similar pre-event 
characteristics, Lie (2005) finds that repurchasing firms actually improve post-event operating 
performance relative to their control firms with similar pre-event characteristics. He further 
concludes that the improvement is restricted to firms which actually repurchase in the 
announcement quarters.  
Undervaluation signaling (or market timing) hypothesis. 
The undervaluation motive is so far the most commonly cited motivation for the repurchase 
decision. This hypothesis argues that managers might signal their disagreement with how the 
market prices their firms based on existing public information. In line with the use of repurchases 
to signal undervaluation, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find excess returns of 
12.14% over the four year post-repurchase period for their entire sample of 1,208 repurchase 
announcements. More importantly, the results show that “value” firms, which are more likely to 
be undervalued, experience significant abnormal returns of 45% over the four year post-repurchase 
period, compared to an insignificant -4.31% for “growth” firms. Other studies also find evidence 
of undervaluation as a common motivation for repurchase (e.g., Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; 
Chan, Ikenberry and Lee, 2004) 
Mimicking hypothesis.  
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Massa et al. (2007) argue that when a firm repurchases its shares, this announcement will 
send a positive signal about itself and a negative signal about its rival firms in the same industry. 
Therefore, the rival firms will also execute repurchase programs to mitigate this negative signal.  
Liquidity provision hypothesis.  
Hong, Wang, and Yu (2008) argue that firms can act as “buyers of last resort” when their 
share prices drop far below fundamental value. They find that firms with fewer financial 
constraints execute repurchase programs to support their stock prices during hard times. This 
increases the liquidity for the stocks and decreases stock volatility over time. Dudley and 
Manakyan (2011) lend some support for this argument by documenting that a firm will repurchase 
its stock when the stock price is under selling pressures caused by financially constrained mutual 
funds. 
Overreaction to bad news hypothesis.  
More recently, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) uncover a new possible motivation for the 
stock repurchase decision. They find evidence that firms use stock repurchases as responses to 
market overreaction to bad news prior to the repurchase i.e., significant analyst downgrades 
combined with overly pessimistic forecasts of long-term earnings. 5 
In a similar vein, we propose a new, related motivation for repurchases. Specifically, we 
examine whether firms repurchase their stock as a reaction to the competitive threat posed by 
strong IPO activity within the industry. 
3. Data and Variable Descriptions. 
The data used in this paper comes from the following sources. Repurchase data and other 
                                                 
5 Other well-known reasons for stock repurchases include the following: dividend substitution, capital structure 
adjustment, tax savings, takeover defense, option funding, and earnings bump. These reasons do not have direct 
relevance to our study so we do not review this literature to conserve space. 
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accounting control variables are from Compustat’s annual data over the period from 1988 to 20116. 
IPO-related data are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues Database. 
We start with the full set of firms in Compustat. Following the repurchase literature, we then 
exclude utilities, financial firms, ADRs, and firms in the financial crash year of 1987. 
We also exclude tender-offers and privately negotiated repurchases because they are 
different from open-market repurchases in terms of flexibility and costs. We require that data be 
available for repurchase variables and control variables. Data for computing stock returns are from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly returns. Our final sample includes 
35,445 firm-year observations of 5,678 firms and spans from 1988 to 2011. 
Following Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) and Yook (2010), I measure dollar repurchases for 
each year as the yearly repurchase of common and preferred stock (prstkc) less any decrease in 
preferred stock. Preferred stocks are measured as, in order of preference, redemption value (pstkr), 
liquidating value (pstkl), or carrying value (pstk). According to Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008), this 
way of measuring actual repurchases is the most accurate method, especially when many 
repurchases are used to mitigate the dilutive effects of employee stock options. In the tobit models, 
we use Percent repurchases as the dependent variable, which is equal to dollar repurchases at year 
t divided by market value of stock at the end of year t-1. In the probit models, we use a Rp_dummy 
as a dependent variable equal to one when a firm repurchases at least 0.25% of its market value of 
equity and zero otherwise. Previous studies choose the cut-off point in the range of 0.25% to 1% 
to screen for significant or real repurchase activity. Our findings do not change if we vary the 
                                                 
6 Compustat starts recording repurchase data since 1986. We require that firms have return data in the past twelve 
months so we lose repurchases in 1986. Following previous studies, we exclude 1987 due to financial crash.  
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cutoffs from 0 to 1%.7 Table 10 shows an annual distribution of firms in the sample based on their 
repurchase activity. Out of 35,445 firm-year observations, we classify 16,719 (or 47%) as 
repurchasers and 18,729 (or 53%) as non-repurchasers. The lowest level of repurchase activity 
occurred during the early 1990’s, while the strongest repurchase activity occurred during the stock 
market bubble period in the late 1990’s as well as from 2006-2008. 
Following the IPO literature, we exclude unit offers, REITs, closed-end funds, banks and 
S&Ls, ADRs, IPOs not listed on CRSP within six months of issuing, and IPOs from utility and 
financial industries. We then merge our Compustat’s repurchase data with SDC’s IPO data based 
on fiscal year and three-digit SIC code industry in order to have data for IPO related variables. 
For our main variable, we use different approaches to capture the market’s perception of 
the competitive threats on the incumbent firms as a result of a large number of IPOs in the same 
industry in a short period of time. First, for each fiscal year, we count the number of IPOs 
(Total_IPOs) which occur in the previous six months in the same three-digit SIC code industry 
with the incumbent firm. We argue that the more IPOs entering the industry will lead to a stronger 
perception of the competitive threats to the existing firms. In addition, as Ritter (1991), and Baker 
and Wurgler (2006, 2007) point out, firms decide to go public when market sentiment is high and, 
thus, IPO volume is positively related to the degree of market sentiment. To capture the 
competitive threat of an IPO wave, we create a High_IPOs dummy variable which receives a value 
of one when Total_IPOs is in the top 20th percentile and zero otherwise. Second, given that some 
industries may have more firms than other industries, the effect of one IPO on a small industry 
may be much stronger than on a much larger industry. Thus, we create a relative measure of total 
                                                 
7 Dittmar (2000) and Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013) use the cut-off point ranging from 0.25% to 1% of a firm’s market 
value of equity. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) show that the mean and median target repurchase are 7% and 5%, 
respectively. 
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IPOs, Adjusted IPOs, which is defined as Total_IPOs divided by the number of existing firms in 
the industry. Similarly, we create a dummy variable, High_AdIPOs which equals one when the 
IPOs_Pct is in the top 20th percentile of Adjusted_IPOs distribution and zero otherwise. Third, 
the competitive impact of IPOs on rival firms might not only be captured by the number of IPO 
events but also by the total proceeds from the new issues. Akhigbe, Borde and Whyte (2003) and 
Hsu et al. (2010), among others, argue that the use of proceeds will increase the competitiveness 
of IPOs, since new issuing firms will use proceeds to reduce its debt burden or to finance 
expansions in businesses. Using proceeds to measure the impact of IPOs on competitive conditions 
within the industry also reduces the problem of counting the number of IPOs, which may include 
very small IPOs - “penny” IPOs. Our Total_Proceeds variable is measured as the sum of proceeds 
of all IPOs which occurred in the previous six months and then scaled by the market capitalization 
of the industry. The dummy variable, High_Proceeds, equals one if it is in the top 20th percentile 
of the Total_Proceeds distribution and zero otherwise. Finally, previous studies show that the 
number of IPOs and IPO first-day returns are both positively related to market sentiment (e.g., 
Ritter (1991), Lowry and Schwert (2002), Baker and Wrugler (2006, 2007)), so we use the first-
day return of IPOs as an alternative measure for the competitive threat of IPOs on rival firms 
during hot IPO markets. Following Ritter’s website, we compute both the equally weighted first-
day returns (RIPO_E) and the proceeds weighted first-day returns (RIPO_P) at the industry level. 
We then create a dummy variable, High_RIPO_E (High_RIPO_P) which takes a value of one if 
RIPO (RIPO_P) is above its mean and takes a value of zero otherwise. We expect that the 
coefficients of our proxies for the IPO competitive threat to be positive and significant in both 
tobit and probit models, showing rival firms repurchase more to support their stock prices under 
pressure caused by a large number of new entrants.  
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Control variables: 
We include several other explanatory variables to control for other hypothesized reasons 
for repurchases. For example, previous studies have shown that a firm’s past performance has a 
significant impact on the firm’s buyback decision. In particular, Comment and Jarrell (1991), 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Peyer and Vermaelen, 1999, and Dudley and Manakyan (2011) 
find empirical evidence that a firm’s repurchases are negatively related to its prior stock price 
performance. Following Dittmar (2000), we compute the firm’s market-adjusted return as the 
return of the previous year minus the return of the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio. We include 
this variable in our regressions to control for the effect of the perceived undervaluation in the 
previous year on its repurchase activity.  
We also control for market-to-book and size. Dittmar (2000) argues that firms with greater 
investment opportunities (high market-to-book) may be reluctant to pay out cash in the form of 
repurchases even if the stock is undervalued; they are more likely to have other investment options 
that would be more profitable than investing in the firm’s stock. To control for firm size, we use 
the log of lagged sales. Size is often considered as a proxy for information asymmetry. Vermaelen 
(1981) shows that small firms face more information asymmetry than large firms, leading to a 
larger likelihood of undervaluation for small firms. In contrast, Dittmar (2000) finds that large 
firms are more likely to repurchase if they are undervalued, suggesting that undervaluation is also 
prevalent for large firms as well.  
Previous research also finds a positive relationship between a firm’s repurchases and its 
cash position. In particular, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that managers use repurchases to 
distribute unexpected cash flows. In a similar vein, Guay and Harford (2000) document that 
managers use repurchases to distribute transient cash flows and use dividends to payout more 
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permanent cash flows. Dittmar (2000) and Dudley and Manakyan (2011) have shown that a firm’s 
cash flow position is positively related to both the probability of repurchases and the size of 
repurchases. Following Dudley and Manakyan (2011), we include two cash-related variables, Cash 
holdings and Cashflows, in our regressions in order to control for the effect of cash on firm 
repurchases. The details of these variables are described in the appendix. 
Additionally, firms may use share repurchases as a means to adjust their capital structure 
(Bagwell and Shoven (1988) and Opler and Titman (1994)), so we include the Debt/Equity ratio, 
measured as long-term debt divided by equity, in our regressions. Following Massa et al. (2007), 
we also include other control variables which have been documented as playing a role in firm 
payout decisions such as operating income, non-operating income, capital expenditures, price-
earnings ratio (P/E), and dividend ratio. All of the control variables are measured at time t-1. 
Definitions of the variables are in the appendix.  
Previous studies find that intra-industry effects are stronger in concentrated industries 
(Lang and Stulz (1992), Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007), among others). We conjecture 
that a rival firm in a concentrated industry is more likely to buy back its stock in the presence of 
strong IPO activity in its industry, as compared to a firm in a less concentrated industry. Following 
Massa et al. (2007), we use the Herfindahl Index to measure the degree of concentration in each 
industry. The Herfindahl index is measured as the sum of the squares of market shares of all the 
firms in a particular industry for a particular year. Market share is defined as the total sales of the 
firm in a given year divided the total sales of the industry in the year.8 The value of this index is 
bounded between zero and one, where the value of zero is for industries with the highest level of 
competition and the value of one is for industries with the highest level of monopoly power.  
                                                 
8 The industry is defined at the three-digit SIC code from CRSP 
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To test the effect of IPO waves on the repurchasing activities of rival firms, we first run 
basic tobit and probit models, without interaction terms between the IPO_threat variable and either 
the Concentration or the Past_return variable.  
Tobit: Rp_Percentaget = β0+ β1IPO_threatt-1 + β3Control variablest-1 + Year Dummies 
+ Industry Dummies. 
Probit: Rp_dummyt = β0+ β1IPO_threatt-1 + β3Control variablest-1 + Year Dummies + 
Industry Dummies. 
Because the coefficients of the tobit or probit model have no direct interpretation, we report 
the marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in a regressor while holding all other 
regressors at their means. This is accomplished by standardizing all continuous regressors to have 
a zero mean and a standard deviation of one9. The marginal effects for the binary regressors are 
evaluated as the effect of moving from a value of 0 to a value of 1. In the above regressions, β1 
will measure the marginal effect of the competitive threat of IPOs on the repurchase activities of 
rival firms. We expect that β1 will be positive and significant after controlling for other factors, 
suggesting that IPO’s competitive threat increases the probability as well as the volume of 
repurchases of rival firms.  
In the next step, the IPO competitive threat variable is interacted with the Concentration 
variable and with the Past_ return variable. In the regressions specified below, the sum of β1, β2 
and β3 represents the effect of the IPO’s competitive threat on the rival firm’s repurchase decision 
when both the Past_return and concentration are one standard deviation from their means, holding 
other variables at their means.  
Tobit: Rp_Percentaget = β0+ β1IPO_threatt-1 + β2IPO_threatt-1cConcentrationt-1+ 
                                                 
9 Marginal effects are computed following Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton and Wang, and Ai (2004) 
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β3IPO_threatt-1cPast returnt-1+ β4Concentrationt-1 + β5Past returnt-1 +β6 Control variablest-1 + 
Year Dummies + Industry Dummies 
Probit: Rp_dummyt = β0+ β1IPO_threatt-1 + β2IPO_threatt-1cConcentrationt-1+ 
β3IPO_threatt-1cPast returnt-1+ β4Concentrationt-1 + β5Past returnt-1 +β6 Control variablest-1 + 
Year Dummies + Industry Dummies 
Since repurchase activities vary by year and by industry, we use year and industry fixed 
effect in all of the regressions. In addition, a firm might repurchase multiple times, so we also 
cluster standard errors by firm to account for the within-firm correlation of residuals across years. 
4. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in this paper. The unconditional 
mean of the repurchase ratio is 0.47, consistent with Massa et al. (2007). On average, a firm 
repurchases about 2.8% of its market value of equity. The average number of IPOs in the previous 
six months (Total_IPOs) is around 2, and the maximum is 24 IPOs10. The means values for IPO 
first day returns are around 17%, which is similar to the first day returns reported on Ritter’s IPO 
database website. 
In Table 11, we present the results of the univariate test for repurchasers and non-
repurchasers. By design, the repurchasers buyback their shares more often than the non-
repurchasers do. Specifically, repurchasers, on average, bought back $203.9 million, or 5.6% of 
their market value, while non-repurchasers only bought back $6.6 million, or 0.19% of their 
market value. The mean differences for IPO related variables and IPO dummies are positive and 
significant, showing stronger IPO activity prior to repurchase events. This initial finding is 
consistent with our conjecture that the competitive threat of IPOs could play a role in repurchase 
                                                 
10 The 20th percentile of Total_IPOs as the benchmark for High_IPOs dummy is 6 IPOs. 
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decision of the rival firms.  
The market-adjusted past return of the average repurchaser is 3%, which is less than one 
third of the past returns of the average non-repurchaser. This evidence supports the undervaluation 
hypothesis which states that firms are more likely to buyback their shares when they have been 
experiencing poor stock performance. This point also emphasizes the importance of controlling 
for the past return in order to observe the net effect of IPO’s competitive threat as well as the 
interaction term between IPOs’ threat and the past return.  
In addition, the average repurchaser has a lower dividend ratio and is smaller in both size 
and market-to-book in comparison with the average non-repurchaser. These observations are also 
consistent with previous studies (Skinner, 2008, Ikenberry at el, 1995; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009 
among others). The two cash related variables (Cash holdings and Cash flows) tell us that 
repurchasers hold more cash and have larger cash flow in comparison with non-repurchasers, in 
line with prior studies. 
In Table 12, we present the correlation matrix of our measurements for IPO’s competitive 
threat. These alternative measurements are highly positively correlated, as expected. This 
consistency in the different measures suggests that they are good proxies for strong IPO activity 
even though they are created using different aspects of the IPO events such as number of IPOs, 
total proceeds, or first-day returns. 
5. Decision to Repurchase. 
a. Tobit model:  
Table 13 reports the marginal effect of tobit models with different measures for IPOs’ 
competitive threats. The dependent variable is Rp_Percentage, which is the dollar repurchases at 
year t divided by the market value of stocks at year t-1, bounded between zero and one. The 
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variable of interest is the dummy variable, IPO_threat, which is represented by different measures. 
The coefficient of this dummy variable measures the average increase in the repurchase percentage 
of a rival firm caused by the IPOs’ threat in the industry.  
The results provided in Table 14 show that the coefficients of the IPO_threat are 
significantly positive and within the range of 0.41 to 0.62. Given the unconditional mean of 
repurchase percentage of 2.75% (in Table 2), this result implies an increase of about 15% in the 
repurchase percentage of the rival firm in the presence of competitive threats from IPOs. This 
effect holds after controlling for other variables which have been documented as determinants of 
repurchase decisions. The coefficients of past return, size, and B/M are negative and significant at 
the 1% level for all of our five specifications. The two cash-related variables have positive and 
significant coefficients, as expected. The other variables have signs which are consistent with 
previous studies, including Dittmar (2000), Massa et al. (2007), and Dudley and Manakyan (2011).  
Prior research has shown that a firm’s past stock performance and the degree of 
concentration of the firm’s industry have a significant impact on the firm’s buyback decision 
(Comment and Jarrell (1991), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Peyer and Vermaelen, 1999, and 
Dudley and Manakyan (2011) among others). In the next step, we create an interaction variable 
between our dummy variable for IPOs threat and the Past_return variable in order to examine 
whether poorly performing rival firms intensify their repurchase activity in the presence of 
competitive threats from IPOs in the industry. In addition, we also interact our IPO_threat variable 
with the Concentration variable to examine the role of industry structure and the degree of 
concentration in determining the intra-industry impact of IPOs’ threat on rival firms’ repurchase 
decisions.  
Table 15 reports the marginal effects of our tobit models with the two interaction variables. 
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The results show that the coefficients of the interaction term between the IPO threat dummy and 
the Concentration variable, IPO_threatcConcentration, are positive and significant for all 
specifications. These findings indicate that a rival firm in a concentrated industry repurchases more 
than a firm in a less concentrated industry in the presence of a competitive threat from IPOs.  
Moreover, for all of our specifications, the coefficients of the interaction term between 
IPO_threat and the Past_return variable are negative and strongly significant at the 1% level. The 
negative sign of this interaction term suggests that a rival firm will buy back its shares even more 
in the presence of competitive threat from IPOs if the rival has had poor stock performance in the 
prior year. The sum of β1, β2, and β3 is equal to the marginal effect of IPOs’ competitive threat on 
the repurchase percentage of a rival firm with a previous year return that is one standard deviation 
below its mean, and an industry concentration that is one standard deviation above its mean. 
Specifically, Table 6 shows that the rival firm whose past return is one standard deviation below 
its mean and whose industry concentration is one standard deviation above its mean increases its 
repurchase percentage by 0.80 in the presence of competitive threats from IPOs. 11 Given the 
unconditional mean of repurchase percentage is 2.75%, this is equivalent to a 29.20% increase in 
the repurchase percentage of the rival firm. The coefficients on other control variables are similar 
in both magnitude and sign to those on Table 5.  
b. Probit model: 
In this section we use the probit model to estimate the probability that the rival firm 
repurchases its stock in the presence of IPOs’ competitive threats. The dependent variable is a 
binary variable, Rp_dummy, which equals one when a firm repurchases at least 0.25% of its 
market value of equity. Similar to the tobit models, we also run the probit models using different 
                                                 
11 Computed by using data on the High_IPOs column as an illustration, 0.4583+0.1324c1+(-0.2131)c(-1)=0.8038  
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measures of the competitive threats of IPOs.  
Table 16 reports the marginal effects of the probit models. The coefficients of IPO_threat 
are significantly positive for all specifications and in the range from 0.052 to 0.078. Given the 
unconditional probability of repurchasing is 0.47, this suggests that the probability that the rival 
firm will buy back its stocks in the presence of competitive threats from IPOs increases by at least 
11.06%.12 The coefficients for Size, M/B and Past_return are negative and significant as expected, 
and consistent with results of tobit models.  
Table 17 reports the marginal effects of probit models with the two interaction variables. 
These results are consistent with those of the tobit models in the previous section. Specifically, the 
coefficients of the interaction term between the IPO_threat dummy and the Concentration variable, 
IPO_threatcConcentration, are positive and significant for all specifications. This finding suggests 
that, when faced with competitive threats from IPOs, a rival firm in a concentrated industry is 
more likely to repurchase its shares than a firm in a less concentrated industry. In addition, the 
interaction term between IPO_threat and the Past_return, IPO_threatcPast_return is negative and 
significant at the 1% level of confidence, suggesting that the probability of repurchasing stock in 
response to the competitive threats caused by IPOs is even higher if the rival firm has been 
experiencing poor stock performance in the previous year. In particular, the results from Table 8 
shows that rival firms whose previous year return is one standard deviation below its mean and 
the level of industry concentration is one standard deviation above its mean increase its probability 
of repurchasing shares by around 0.17 in the presence of competitive threats from IPOs in the 
industry. With an unconditional probability of repurchase of 0.47, this result indicates that the 
probability that a poorly performing rival firm in a concentrated industry will buyback its stock 
                                                 
12 0.052/0.47=0.1106 or 11.06% 
36 
 
increases by about 37.1%. This reflects a 26% increase in the probability of repurchase compared 
to the case where the rival firm has an average stock performance and is in an industry with an 
average level of concentration. The coefficients for other control variables are similar to the 
findings in Table 7. 
In examining corporate financing waves, Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) look at the aggregate 
patterns of equity issuances, repurchases, and mergers and find interesting linkages among these 
events. In particular, they find that repurchases are positively correlated with both equity issuances 
and mergers at the aggregate level. The correlation between repurchase and equity issuance 
activity is 90%. This result seems inconsistent with the market-timing explanation which predicts 
a negative correlation between equity issuance waves and repurchases waves. They observe that 
both equity issuance waves and repurchase waves are reactions to a common stimulus, GDP 
growth. Specifically, both repurchases and issues tend to increase over an economic expansion 
and decrease over an economic contraction. Growth in issues tends to occur in earlier stages of the 
cycle than growth in repurchases because, in the early stage of the cycle, firms are in greater need 
of funds to finance their relatively strong investment opportunities.13. In the later stages, firms 
experience excess cash and will distribute it through stock repurchases. Even though we control 
for the effects of the firm’s cash flow position in the regressions, we want to examine whether the 
impacts of IPO waves on the rival firms’ repurchasing behavior are influenced by business cycles 
as pointed out by Dittmar and Dittmar (2008). To address this issue, we stratify our sample period 
into expansion and contraction periods using the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER)’s definition and re-run our regressions.14 In addition, since the sample period includes the 
                                                 
13 This pattern has been confirmed by Rau and Stouraitis (2011) as well. 
14 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defined recessionary economies as in July 1981 –Nov 1982, July 
1990 –Mar 1991, March 2001–Nov 2001, and Dec 2007 – June 2009. Because our repurchase data is per year, we 
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internet bubble years of 1999 and 2000, during which many IPOs took place, we need to control 
for this time period. In addition, Grullon and Michaely (2002) also point out that during the same 
time period, 1999 and 2000, share repurchases, for the first time in history, became more common 
than dividends. While we control for year effect in our regressions, we re-run our regressions using 
a sample without observations in 1999 and 2000. 
Table 18 reports the marginal effects of the tobit models for the three subsamples. We only 
report the results for High_IPOs dummy to save space since our other measures for IPO_theat 
provide similar results. The results from Table 9 show that, on average, the effects of IPOs’ 
competitive threats on rival firms’ repurchases are somewhat stronger in the expansionary period; 
however, these effects are still statistically and economically significant in the contractionary 
period as well. In particularly, given the IPOs’ competitive threat within the last six months, the 
rival firm will increase its repurchases by about 0.48 (or 18.6%) in recessionary economy and by 
about 0.52 (or 18.9%) in an expansionary economy. Moreover, if the rival firm’s previous year 
return is one standard deviation below its mean and its industry concentration is one standard 
above its mean, the repurchase volume will increase by about 0.66 (or 24.0%) in a recessionary 
economy and by about 0.77 (or 28.0%) in an expansionary economy. For the subsample without 
the two bubble years, 1999 and 2000, we reach similar conclusions as those with the full sample.  
Table 19 reports the marginal effects of the probit models for the same three subsamples. 
Again, only the results for High_IPOs dummy are reported to save space. Similar to the tobit 
results, the findings from Table 10 show that the effects of IPOs’ competitive threats on rival 
firms’ probability of repurchases are stronger in the expansionary period, but still significant in 
the contractionary periods as well. More specifically, in response to the IPOs competitive threats, 
                                                 
consider the entire year as recession year, i.e., 1981, 1982, 1990, 1991, 2001, 2007, 2008 and 2009 are considered 
recession years.  
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the rival firm will increase its probability of repurchase by about 0.05 (or 10.6%) if the economy 
is in recession, and by about 0.07 (or 14.9%) if the economy is in expansion. These effects are 
even more pronounced for firms with poor return performance in the prior year and for firms in 
high concentration industries, consistent with our previous findings. Similar to the results of the 
tobit model for the subsample without the two bubble years, 1999 and 2000, the results of the 
probit model for this subsample are very close to the results for the entire sample, indicating that 
our previous conclusions are not driven by the two bubble years.  
Overall, these results provide robust evidence that firms may strategically use repurchases 
in response to the competitive threats associated with IPO waves in their industry. In documenting 
this competitive-based motivation for repurchases, these findings further highlight the complexity 
of the repurchase decision. 
6. Conclusion  
The goal of this paper is to examine whether rival firms use repurchases as a strategic 
reaction to the competitive effects of IPOs in the same industry. We find that rival firms increase 
their repurchases in response to the competitive threats caused by a large number of IPOs in the 
industry during the previous six months. The intensity of repurchase activities depends on the rival 
firm’s previous year stock performance and the level of concentration in its industry. In particular, 
the rival firm’s repurchase is negatively related to its previous year return and positively related 
to the level of concentration in its industry. Overall, our paper provides evidence that firms 
strategically use repurchases in response to the competitive threats associated with IPOs in their 
industry. Thus, these findings highlight a previously unrecognized motivation behind the 
repurchase decision. Also, this paper adds intriguing new evidence on intra-industry signaling by 
showing that certain events such as IPOs can affect not only rival firm stock prices, but also rival 
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firm decisions. Furthermore, our paper provides insight on the sequence of equity issuance and 
repurchase waves documented in Dittmar and Dittmar (2008), by showing that IPO waves can 
provoke repurchases within the same industry.  
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Appendix A: 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Open-Market Stock Repurchase Announcements  
from 1988 to 2010 
 
The OMR announcements are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database from 1988 
to 2010. The sample excludes announcements from utilities and financial firms and those with deal value less than one million 
dollars. If a firm has more than one announcement in one year, we only keep the first announcement. Our final sample has 6,311 
repurchase announcements from 2,854 firms. Following Yook (2010), repurchasing firms (non-repurchasing firms) are firms that 
have positive (zero) repurchases from announcement quarter through quarter t+4.  
 
Year Full sample % Repurchasing firms % Non-repurchasing firms % 
1988 103 1.6% 71 68.9% 32 31.1% 
1989 201 3.2% 150 74.6% 51 25.4% 
1990 298 4.7% 165 55.4% 133 44.6% 
1991 121 1.9% 80 66.1% 41 33.9% 
1992 195 3.1% 134 68.7% 61 31.3% 
1993 198 3.1% 141 71.2% 57 28.8% 
1994 281 4.5% 187 66.5% 94 33.5% 
1995 288 4.6% 207 71.9% 81 28.1% 
1996 381 6.0% 278 73.0% 103 27.0% 
1997 410 6.5% 307 74.9% 103 25.1% 
1998 640 10.1% 446 69.7% 194 30.3% 
1999 417 6.6% 310 74.3% 107 25.7% 
2000 260 4.1% 180 69.2% 80 30.8% 
2001 207 3.3% 137 66.2% 70 33.8% 
2002 165 2.6% 124 75.2% 41 24.8% 
2003 145 2.3% 104 71.7% 41 28.3% 
2004 229 3.6% 185 80.8% 44 19.2% 
2005 270 4.3% 224 83.0% 46 17.0% 
2006 247 3.9% 206 83.4% 41 16.6% 
2007 372 5.9% 318 85.5% 54 14.5% 
2008 463 7.3% 301 65.0% 162 35.0% 
2009 167 2.6% 134 80.2% 33 19.8% 
2010 253 4.0% 214 84.6% 39 15.4% 
Total 6,311 100.0% 4,603 72.9% 1,708 27.1% 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
                 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the full sample and for subsamples based on whether a firm actually repurchases. Size is measured as the market value of equity in the 
month prior to the repurchase announcement. B/M is the book-to-market value of equity, measured as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement date. Earnings is the 
percentage change in earnings before extraordinary items (IB in COMPUSTAT) of the announcement year relative to the prior year, or (Earnings) = [(IBt-IBt-1)/IBt-1], where year 
t is the repurchase announcement year. Performance is measured as the monthly compounded return for 12 months prior to the repurchase announcement month. Risk change (Risk 
is the change in the systematic risk of the firm, measured as the beta estimate for the [+30, +250] window minus the beta estimate for the [-250, -30] window using the market model. 
Real_RP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a repurchasing firm, and 0 otherwise. Repurchasing firms (non-repurchasing firms) are firms whose total repurchases from 
announcement quarter through quarter t+4 are positive (zero). The quarterly repurchases are measured as adjusted PRSTKCYt – any decrease in preferred stock. Preferred stock is 
measured as, in order of preference, PSTKRV (redemption value), PSTKL (liquidating value), or PSTK (carrying value). Car [-1, +1] is the cumulative abnormal return for the three 
day window [-1, +1] around the repurchase announcement, using the market model.          
      
                  
   
 
                 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Full sample [6,311]  Repurchasing Firms [4,603]  Non-repurchasing Firms [1,708] 
 P5 Mean P95 SD  P5 Mean P95 SD  P5 Mean P95 SD 
Size (Mil.) 26 2,136 15,807 4,004  29 2,492 15,807 4,345  26 1,176 6,145 2,664 
B/M 0.07 0.53 1.48 0.38  0.08 0.55 1.48 0.36  0.07 0.48 1.48 0.40 
Earnings -2.36 0.13 3.03 0.00  -1.71 0.19 3.00 1.07  -2.36 -0.03 1.28 3.00 
Performance -0.41 0.10 0.66 113.32  -0.41 0.09 0.66 0.33  -0.41 0.11 0.66 0.38 
Risk -1.00 -0.09 0.74 0.56  -0.94 -0.09 0.71 0.53  -1.17 -0.10 0.85 0.63 
Real_RP 0.00 0.73 1.00 0.44  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Car [-1,1] -0.08 0.02 0.15 0.09   -0.08 0.02 0.14 0.08   -0.10 0.03 0.19 0.10 
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Table 3: Post-Repurchase Announcement Calendar-Time Factor Model Regressions 
 
For every month, we calculate the equally weighted returns for the portfolio of all firms that made a stock repurchase announcement during the preceding 12, 24, 36 or 48 calendar 
months. In panel A, we estimate the portfolio’s monthly abnormal returns (αp) using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model Rp,t − Rf,t = αp + βp (Rm,t − Rf,t ) + sp SMBt + hp 
HMLt + ep,t. In panel B, we estimate the portfolio’s monthly abnormal returns (αp) using Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the momentum factor: Rp,t − Rf,t = αp + βp 
(Rm,t − Rf,t ) + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + upUMDt + ep,t. Rp,t is the return of the event portfolio in month t; Rf,t is the 1-month U.S. Treasury bill rate in month t; Rm,t is the return on the 
value-weighted index of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed stocks in month t; SMBt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks in month t; and 
HMLt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high and low B/M value of equity ratio in month t. UMDt is the average of the returns on two (big and small) high prior 
return portfolios minus the average of the returns on two low prior return portfolios in month t. The intercept αp is the monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio of 12, 24, 36, 
or 48 months. The statistical significance of each of the average abnormal monthly returns is tested using the parametric t-test. a, b, c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively, in two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A: Calendar-Time Portfolio method with the Fama-French three factors       
               
 Full sample  Repurchasing firms  Non-repurchasing firms 
  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 
Alpha(%) 0.312 0.327 0.315 0.306  0.313 0.332 0.331 0.314  0.307 0.312 0.324 0.282 
t-stat. 2.41b 2.88a 3.00a 2.87a  2.54b 2.95a 3.28a 3.30a  1.37 1.51 1.68c 1.37 
               
Beta 1.025 1.013 1.008 1.008  0.964 0.971 0.970 0.972  1.168 1.131 1.128 1.130 
t-stat. 33.53a 36.98a 38.91a 39.85a  33.02a 37.11a 39.22a 40.23a  25.56a 29.94a 31.21a 32.12a 
s 0.577 0.602 0.611 0.604  0.496 0.524 0.537 0.536  0.776 0.791 0.807 0.792 
t-stat. 14.61a 17.01a 18.27a 18.49a  13.16a 15.53a 16.82a 17.17a  13.16a 16.22a 17.29a 17.44a 
h 0.266 0.287 0.300 0.318  0.227 0.276 0.306 0.327  0.345 0.304 0.278 0.291 
t-stat. 6.20a 7.45a 8.23a 8.94a  5.54a 7.50a 8.81a 9.63a  5.37a 5.73a 5.48a 5.89a 
N 276 276 276 276  276 276 276 276  276 276 276 276 
R2 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.89   0.85 0.88 0.89 0.89   0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86 
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Panel B: Calendar-Time Portfolio method with the Fama-French three factors and momentum factor.    
               
 Full sample  Repurchasing firms  Non-repurchasing firms 
  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 
αp(%) 0.558 0.556 0.533 0.507  0.528 0.523 0.522 0.501  0.584 0.600 0.531 0.481 
t-stat. 5.30a 5.90a 5.90a 5.74a  5.01a 5.60a 5.81a 5.79a  1.47 1.59 1.72c 1.91c 
               
Beta 0.920 0.918 0.921 0.923  0.873 0.887 0.893 0.898  1.032 1.010 1.012 1.012 
t-stat. 35.28a 39.42a 41.20a 42.24a  33.49a 38.38a 40.24a 41.25a  24.79a 30.26a 31.73a 33.27a 
s 0.586 0.610 0.619 0.612  0.504 0.532 0.544 0.542  0.788 0.802 0.817 0.803 
t-stat. 18.48a 21.54a 22.77a 23.02a  15.91a 18.93a 20.14a 20.49a  15.57a 19.77a 21.08a 21.71a 
h 0.166 0.196 0.216 0.237  0.140 0.196 0.233 0.256  0.215 0.188 0.167 0.178 
t-stat. 4.67a 6.18a 7.11a 7.95a  3.94a 6.22a 7.71a 8.65a  3.79a 4.14a 3.85a 4.31a 
u -0.255 -0.229 -0.211 -0.206  -0.222 -0.203 -0.185 -0.179  -0.329 -0.294 -0.282 -0.286 
t-stat. -11.99a -12.09a -11.61a -11.56a  -10.44a -10.80a -10.23a -10.10a  -9.69a -10.80a -10.85a -11.53a 
N 276 276 276 276  276 276 276 276  276 276 276 276 
R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.93   0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93   0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 
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Table 4: Mean and Median Values of Matching Criteria for Repurchase Firms and Matched Firms 
 
The non-event benchmark firms are chosen using the following matching criteria: (1) firm size, measured as the market value of equity in the month prior to the repurchase 
announcement; (2) firm size and two digit SIC code; (3) size and book to market ratio (B/M is measured as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement date); (4) size and 
performance (measured as the monthly compounded returns in the 12 months prior to the repurchase announcement month; (5) Earnings, the percentage change in earnings before 
extraordinary items (IB in COMPUSTAT) of the announcement year relative to the prior year; and (6) size and earnings. For matching by size (by earnings) we require that the size 
(earnings) of the matched firm be between 60% and 140% of the market value of equity (earnings) of the repurchasing firms. For matching by size and B/M, we select the matched 
firm which has smallest difference in B/M from all firms which have size between 60% and 140% of the market value of equity of the repurchasing firms. Similar procedures are 
applied for matching by size and performance; and by size and earnings. If a matched firm is delisted, we replace it by the next-best matched firm. The matched firms cannot have 
any repurchase announcements 4 years before and 4 years after the event year. 
   
Size (Mil.$)  B/M  Performance  Earnings 
 N  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
              
Size 
6,311 Event firms 2136.14 402.94  0.53 0.40  0.10 0.05  0.13 0.08 
6,311 Matched firms 2100.57 402.66  1.70 0.47  0.08 0.05  -0.28 0.07 
              
Size-Industry 
6,311 Event firms 2136.14 402.94  0.53 0.40  0.10 0.05  0.13 0.08 
6,311 Matched firms 2175.52 402.47  1.56 0.41  0.09 0.05  -0.18 0.06 
              
Size-B/M 
6,311 Event firms 2136.14 402.94  0.53 0.40  0.10 0.05  0.13 0.08 
6,311 Matched firms 2212.00 392.00  0.52 0.39  0.08 0.05  -0.22 0.09 
              
Size-Performance 
6,311 Event firms 2136.14 402.94  0.53 0.40  0.10 0.05  0.13 0.08 
6,311 Matched firms 2127.00 402.32  1.72 0.56  0.10 0.05  -0.11 0.09 
              
∆Earnings 
6,311 Event firms 2136.14 402.94  0.53 0.40  0.10 0.05  0.13 0.08 
6,311 Matched firms 2738.33 475.32  1.14 0.41  0.09 0.04  0.13 0.08 
              
Size-Earnings∆ 
6,311 Event firms 2136.14 402.94  0.53 0.40  0.10 0.05  0.13 0.08 
6,311 Matched firms 2013.65 400.23   1.51 0.49   0.09 0.05   0.12 0.08 
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Table 5: Post-Announcement Long-Term Buy-and-Hold Average Abnormal Returns Estimated Using the Matching Method 
 
The holding period abnormal return is computed using BHAR(i,a,b)=∏ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 1)𝑏𝑡=𝑎 -∏ (𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 1)
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎 , where BHAR(i,a,b) is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for event firm i over the 
holding period from a to b, Rit is the return on stock i in month t, and Rmt is the return on the matched firm in month t. The buy-and-hold average abnormal returns (BHAAR) are 
measured from 12 months up to 48 months following the event. The BHAR is winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. If an event firm is delisted before the end of a holding period, 
we keep its returns and replace the missing values by the matched firm’s returns. We use both t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to determine statistical significance. a, b, c denote significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Full sample [6,311]  Repurchasing firms [4,603]  Non-repurchasing firms [1,708] 
Matching 
criteria 
 1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 
Size 
BHAR 0.058 0.100 0.134 0.162  0.065 0.120 0.189 0.245  0.037 0.049 -0.012 -0.056 
t-stat. 8.15a 9.32a 9.77a 10.27a  8.21a 9.92a 12.34a 13.84a  2.52b 2.15b -0.44 -1.73c 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.04 0.21 0.23 0.04 
Size-Industry 
BHAR 0.053 0.113 0.131 0.151  0.065 0.132 0.198 0.257  0.033 0.047 -0.011 -0.055 
t- stat. 8.17a 9.31a 9.69a 10.18a  8.18a 9.41a 12.61a 13.51a  2.50b 2.17b -0.46 -1.76c 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.04 0.26 0.23 0.04 
Size-B/M 
BHAR 0.039 0.068 0.099 0.113  0.047 0.085 0.143 0.189  0.018 0.026 -0.014 -0.084 
t- stat. 5.37a 6.29a 7.11a 6.88a  5.73a 6.90a 9.01a 10.13a  1.19 1.14 -0.48 -2.48b 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.32 0.20 0.70 0.06 
Size-
performance 
BHAR 0.002 0.040 0.068 0.091  0.012 0.055 0.100 0.136  -0.023 0.001 -0.014 -0.027 
t- stat. 9.11a 5.13a 6.08a 6.70a  6.40a 6.15a 7.72a 8.61a  -6.72a 0.07 -0.63 -1.04 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.86 0.79 0.35 
Earnings 
BHAR 0.025 0.042 0.051 0.080  0.024 0.055 0.099 0.154  0.029 0.007 -0.073 -0.115 
t- stat. 2.06b 2.45b 3.81a 2.51b  2.09b 2.49b 3.42a 2.51b  0.99 0.34 -2.72a -3.67a 
W-val. 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03  0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04  0.45 0.68 0.00 0.00 
Size- 
Earnings 
BHAR -0.003 0.013 0.006 0.005  0.001 0.013 0.021 0.021  -0.015 0.014 -0.031 -0.038 
t- stat. -2.25b 1.74 0.55 0.57  0.86 1.50 1.55 1.30  -5.12a 0.88 -1.39 -1.20 
W-val. 0.00 0.15 0.66 0.93   0.20 0.22 0.13 0.15   0.00 0.46 0.72 0.93 
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Table 6: Post-Announcement Average Abnormal Returns for Repurchasing Firms in Different Sub-Periods 
Table 6 presents the post-announcement average abnormal returns for repurchasing firms only. Panel A shows the abnormal monthly returns estimated using the 
calendar-time method for sub-periods. The bubble (crisis) years are defined as 1999-2001 and 2007-2009, respectively. For every month, we calculate the equally 
weighted returns for the portfolio of all repurchasing firms that made a stock repurchase announcement during the preceding 12, 24, 36 or 48 calendar months. In 
panel A, we estimate the portfolio’s monthly abnormal returns (αp) using Fama and French (1993) three-factor model Rp,t − Rf,t = αp + βp (Rm,t − Rf,t ) + sp SMBt + 
hp HMLt + ep,t. Rp,t is the return of the event portfolio in month t; Rf,t is the 1-month U.S. Treasury bill rate in month t; Rm,t is the return on the value-weighted index 
of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed stocks in month t; SMBt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks in month t; and 
HMLt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high and low B/M value of equity ratio in month t. The intercept αp is the monthly abnormal return of 
the event portfolio of 12, 24, 36, or 48. 
Panel B shows the buy-and-hold average abnormal returns estimated using the matching method for repurchasing firms only. The holding period abnormal return 
is computed using BHAR(i,a,b)=∏ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 1)𝑏𝑡=𝑎 -∏ (𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 1)
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎 , where BHAR(i,a,b) is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for event firm i over the holding period 
from a to b, Rit is the return on stock i on month t, and Rmt is the return on the matched firm on month t. The buy-and-hold average abnormal returns (BHAAR) are 
measured from 12 months up to 48 months following the event. The BHAR is winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. If an event firm is delisted before the end of 
a holding period, we keep its returns and replace the missing values by the matched firm’s returns. We use both t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to determine statistical 
significance. a, b, c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Monthly Returns Estimated Using the Calendar-Time Method for Repurchasing Firms Only   
               
 1988-2000  2001-2010  Exclude Bubble/crisis years 
 1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 
αp(%) 0.265 0.315 0.329 0.296  0.625 0.638 0.640 0.620  0.299 0.311 0.322 0.312 
t- stat. 1.63 2.01b 2.52b 2.39b  3.40a 3.58a 3.63a 3.50a  2.47b 2.74a 3.07a 2.77a 
               
Beta 0.973 0.995 0.973 0.962  1.090 1.132 1.146 1.155  0.974 0.966 0.960 0.957 
t- stat. 21.35a 23.58a 28.14a 29.01a  28.10a 30.14a 30.80a 30.57a  34.83a 38.11a 38.44a 37.22a 
s 0.507 0.602 0.559 0.538  0.693 0.679 0.686 0.684  0.471 0.512 0.516 0.527 
t- stat. 10.69a 11.74a 14.84a 10.04a  13.16a 10.16a 10.38a 10.19a  12.22a 15.62a 16.05a 15.26a 
h 0.335 0.352 0.392 0.375  -0.217 -0.192 0.306 -0.154  0.256 0.277 0.375 0.426 
t- stat. 5.50a 6.15a 8.26a 8.27a  -3.71a -3.39a -3.14a -2.70a  4.69a 7.11a 8.08a 9.18a 
N 156 156 156 156  120 120 120 120  156 156 156 156 
R2 0.80 0.82 0.86 0.86   0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93   0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 
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Panel B: Post-Announcement Long-term Buy-and-Hold Average Abnormal Returns Estimated Using the Matching Method for Repurchasing Firms Only 
                
  1988-2000 [2,779]  2001-2010 [1,824]  Exclude crisis years [3,074] 
    1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 
Size 
BHAR 0.076 0.150 0.232 0.304  0.048 0.073 0.122 0.152  0.044 0.086 0.147 0.211 
t-stat. 7.26a 9.29a 11.23a 12.75a  3.97a 4.05a 5.46a 5.90a  4.72a 5.79a 7.79a 9.81a 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
Size-Industry 
BHAR 0.075 0.133 0.241 0.315  0.007 -0.001 -0.054 0.031  0.048 0.080 0.124 0.202 
t-stat. 7.13a 8.10a 10.12a 11.26a  3.94a 4.00a 5.11a 5.57a  4.61a 5.62a 6.12a 9.13a 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
Size-B/M 
BHAR 0.050 0.103 0.177 0.224  0.042 0.055 0.088 0.134  0.027 0.056 0.109 0.149 
t-stat. 4.61a 6.23a 8.37a 8.81a  3.40a 3.11a 3.75a 5.05a  2.82a 3.75a 5.62a 6.56a 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
Size-
performance 
BHAR 0.013 0.066 0.124 0.177  0.012 0.037 0.061 0.072  0.013 0.047 0.092 0.137 
t-stat. 5.61a 5.47a 7.00a 8.07a  5.99a 2.88a 3.39a 3.35a  5.27a 4.26a 5.83a 7.08a 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
Earnings 
BHAR 0.024 0.066 0.126 0.191  0.024 0.036 0.057 0.095  0.014 0.026 0.063 0.120 
t-stat. 2.25b 2.38b 3.14a 2.79a  2.00b 2.00b 2.50b 2.37b  1.46 1.74b 2.38b 2.48b 
W-val. 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 
                
Size- Earnings 
BHAR 0.001 0.010 0.018 0.020  -0.005 0.016 -0.011 -0.020  -0.001 0.012 0.007 0.004 
t-stat. 0.73 1.41 1.56 1.20  -0.31 0.73 0.85 0.73  -0.27 0.31 0.44 0.21 
W-val. 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.14   0.22 0.17 0.11 0.12   0.22 0.50 0.72 0.69 
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Table 7: Post-Announcement Average Abnormal Returns for Repurchasing Firms Divided in Subsamples by Size, B/M, 
Performance, and Earnings Terciles. 
 
Table 7 presents the post-announcement average abnormal returns for repurchasing firms only, divided in subsamples by Size, B/M, Performance, and Earnings terciles. We place 
firms into size terciles based on their sizes (measured as the market value of equity in the month prior to the repurchase announcement) relative to the sizes of all Compustat/CRSP 
firms in the month prior to the announcement month. B/M terciles are based on the B/M ratio of the repurchasing firm at the fiscal year-end prior to the repurchase announcement 
relative to the B/M ratio of all Compustat firms in that particular year. A firm’s performance tercile is based on its performance (measured as monthly compounded returns for 12 
month prior to the announcement months) relative to all Compustat/CRSP firms in that month. Firms are divided into earnings terciles based on their Earnings relative to all 
Compustat/CRSP firms in that month. The calendar-time portfolio method is used to estimate the abnormal monthly returns for repurchasing firms. For every month, we calculate 
the equally weighted returns for the portfolio of all repurchasing firms that made a stock repurchase announcement during the preceding 12, 24, 36 or 48 calendar months. We 
estimate the portfolio’s monthly abnormal returns (αp) using Fama and French (1993) three-factor model Rp,t − Rf,t = αp + βp (Rm,t − Rf,t ) + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + ep,t. The buy-and-
hold average abnormal returns are estimated using the matching by Size and Earnings. The holding period abnormal return is computed using BHAR(i,a,b)=∏ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 1)𝑏𝑡=𝑎 -
∏ (𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 1)𝑏𝑡=𝑎 , where BHAR(i,a,b) is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for event firm i over the holding period from a to b, Rit is the return on stock i on month t, and Rmt is the 
return on the matched firm on month t. If an event firm is delisted before the end of a holding period, we keep its returns and replace the missing values by the matched firm’s returns. 
The BHAR is winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. We use both t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to determine statistical significance. a, b, c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Size   Small  Medium  Large 
    1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 
Calendar-Time 
Method  
Alpha(%) 1.182 1.008 0.888 0.823  0.323 0.306 0.331 0.374  0.166 0.213 0.252 0.233 
t-stat. 3.46a 3.24a 3.04a 2.83a  1.91c 2.04b 2.40b 2.86a  1.32 1.82c 2.23b 2.08c 
N 276 276 276 276  276 276 276 276  276 276 276 276 
 BHAR 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.011  0.004 0.004 0.015 0.003  0 0.021 0.028 0.034 
Matching  t-stat. 0.16 0.33 0.41 0.9  0.23 0.23 0.56 0.8  0.44 0.48 0.47 0.49 
by Size- 
Earnings 
W-val. 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.15 
 
0.17 0.74 0.61 0.86 
 
0.62 0.65 0.75 0.72 
 N 740 740 740 740  1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352  2,511 2,511 2,511 2,511 
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Panel B: Post-Announcement Long-term Buy-and-Hold Average Abnormal Returns Estimated Using the Matching Method for Repurchasing Firms Only 
                
  1988-2000 [2,779]  2001-2010 [1,824]  Exclude crisis years [3,074] 
    1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 
Size 
BHAR 0.076 0.150 0.232 0.304  0.048 0.073 0.122 0.152  0.044 0.086 0.147 0.211 
t-stat. 7.26a 9.29a 11.23a 12.75a  3.97a 4.05a 5.46a 5.90a  4.72a 5.79a 7.79a 9.81a 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
Size-Industry 
BHAR 0.075 0.133 0.241 0.315  0.007 -0.001 -0.054 0.031  0.048 0.080 0.124 0.202 
t-stat. 7.13a 8.10a 10.12a 11.26a  3.94a 4.00a 5.11a 5.57a  4.61a 5.62a 6.12a 9.13a 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
Size-B/M 
BHAR 0.050 0.103 0.177 0.224  0.042 0.055 0.088 0.134  0.027 0.056 0.109 0.149 
t-stat. 4.61a 6.23a 8.37a 8.81a  3.40a 3.11a 3.75a 5.05a  2.82a 3.75a 5.62a 6.56a 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
Size-performance 
BHAR 0.013 0.066 0.124 0.177  0.012 0.037 0.061 0.072  0.013 0.047 0.092 0.137 
t-stat. 5.61a 5.47a 7.00a 8.07a  5.99a 2.88a 3.39a 3.35a  5.27a 4.26a 5.83a 7.08a 
W-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
Earnings 
BHAR 0.024 0.066 0.126 0.191  0.024 0.036 0.057 0.095  0.014 0.026 0.063 0.120 
t-stat. 2.25b 2.38b 3.14a 2.79a  2.00b 2.00b 2.50b 2.37b  1.46 1.74b 2.38b 2.48b 
W-val. 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 
                
Size- Earnings 
BHAR 0.001 0.010 0.018 0.020  -0.005 0.016 -0.011 -0.020  
-
0.001 0.012 0.007 0.004 
t-stat. 0.73 1.41 1.56 1.20  -0.31 0.73 0.85 0.73  -0.27 0.31 0.44 0.21 
W-val. 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.14   0.22 0.17 0.11 0.12   0.22 0.50 0.72 0.69 
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Table 8: Post-Announcement Average Abnormal Returns for Repurchase Announcement Firms: Controlling for Earnings 
Momentum and the Fama-French Three Factors 
This table examines whether the repurchase announcement firms exhibit post-announcement abnormal returns that are significantly different from the returns of 
firms that experienced similar earnings change but did not make repurchase announcements. We first obtain excess monthly returns by subtracting the monthly 
returns of the matched firms based on earnings from the monthly returns of repurchase announcement firms. Then we create a rolling portfolio using the excess 
monthly returns and use the Fama-French three factor model to estimate the abnormal return. The statistical significance of each of the average abnormal 
monthly returns is tested using the parametric t-test. a, b, c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed test. 
 
Full sample  Repurchasing firms  Non-repurchasing firms 
  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs  1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 
αp(%) -0.054 0.010 0.004 0.012  0.020 0.053 0.050 0.062  -0.183 -0.007 -0.033 -0.049 
t-stat. -0.58 0.12 0.05 0.15  0.20 0.60 0.61 0.76  -1.08 -0.05 -0.27 -0.41 
               
Beta -0.025 -0.041 -0.037 -0.032  -0.048 -0.057 -0.054 -0.054  0.051 0.030 0.048 0.080 
t-stat. -1.12 -2.01b -1.87c -1.64  -2.05b -2.70a -2.74a -2.77a  1.27 0.92 1.59 2.80 
s -0.016 -0.013 0.003 0.005  -0.051 -0.044 -0.020 -0.013  0.103 0.101 0.107 0.099 
t-stat. -0.57 -0.49 0.13 0.20  -1.68c -1.63 -0.79 -0.53  1.97b 2.42b 2.75a 2.67a 
h 0.031 0.028 0.024 0.024  -0.004 0.011 0.021 0.012  0.110 0.059 0.025 0.061 
t-stat. 0.99 0.97 0.87 0.86  -0.11 0.38 0.75 0.45  1.96b 1.32 0.59 1.53 
N 276 276 276 276  276 276 276 276  276 276 276 276 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01   0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03   0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 
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Table 9: Cross-Sectional Regressions: Explaining Post Repurchase Abnormal Returns 
 
Table 9 reports the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis of the post-announcement buy-and-hold size-
adjusted abnormal return of the repurchase announcement firms on several determinant factors. BHARi = the post-
announcement buy-and-hold abnormal return of the repurchase announcement firm i– the corresponding return of its 
size-matched firm. BHAR1, BHAR2, BHAR3, BHAR4 are the buy-and-hold size-adjusted abnormal returns of the 
repurchase announcement firms for 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years following the repurchase announcements 
respectively. AdjSizei is the ratio of the market value of equity of repurchase announcement firm i in the month prior 
to the repurchase announcement month to the mean market value of all firms on CRSP during the event year. B/M is 
the equity book value to its market value of the event firm i where book value is of the fiscal year prior to the 
announcement year and market value is the market value of equity at December of the year prior to announcement 
year. Earnings is the percentage change in earnings before extraordinary items (IB in COMPUSTAT) in the 
announcement year relative to the prior year. Performance is measured as the monthly compounded return for 12 
months prior to the repurchase announcement. Risk is the change in the systematic risk of the firm and equals to the 
beta estimate for [+30, +250] window minus the beta estimate for [-250, -30] window using the market model. 
Real_RP is the dummy variable which receives a value of 1 if the firm is a repurchasing firm and 0 otherwise. 
EarningsicReal_RPi is the interaction term between Earnings and Real_RP. Marketi is the market return minus the 
risk-free return during the announcement month (measured by the value-weighted CRSP index and the rate on the 1-
month U.S. Treasury bill, respectively). The statistical significance of the parameter estimates is tested using the White 
(1980) corrected t-stat. (in parentheses). N is the number of observations. a, b, c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed test.       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
BHAR1 BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR2 BHAR3 BHAR3 BHAR4 BHAR4 
         
Earnings 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.008 
 3.06a 2.87a 2.31b 2.22b 1.96b 1.93b 1.82b 1.85b 
EarningscReal_RP  0.005  0.004  0.002  0.001 
  2.68a  2.06b  1.65c  1.51 
         
Real_RP 0.063 0.064 0.071 0.071 0.083 0.084 0.083 0.085 
 4.31a 4.36a 4.50a 4.52a 7.50a 7.51a 8.96a 8.98a 
AdjSize -0.068 -0.068 -0.088 -0.088 -0.117 -0.117 -0.129 -0.129 
 -2.18b -2.17b -2.67a -2.67a -2.51b -2.51b -2.67a -2.67a 
B/M 0.011 0.010 0.039 0.039 0.069 0.069 0.099 0.100 
 1.65c 1.68c 1.73c 1.73c 1.76c 1.76c 2.13b 2.14b 
Performance -0.041 -0.041 -0.043 -0.043 -0.042 -0.042 -0.041 -0.041 
 -9.53a -9.55a -10.28a -10.27a -8.08a -8.06a -7.63a -7.63a 
Risk -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 
 -1.37 -1.36 -1.47 -1.47 -1.65c -1.66c -1.73c -1.71c 
Market 0.060 0.059 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.024 
 0.42 0.42 1.02 1.03 0.25 0.25 0.72 0.73 
Intercept -0.040 -0.040 -0.059 -0.058 -0.513 -0.513 -0.518 -0.518 
 -2.33b -2.32b -2.14b -2.13b -3.56a -3.56a -4.13a -4.13a 
Year_dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 6,311 6,311 6,255 6,255 6,015 6,015 6,015 6,015 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
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Table 10: Distribution of the Number of Firm-Year Repurchases. 
Repurchase data and other accounting control variables are from Compustat’s annual data over the period from 1988 to 2011. IPO 
data is obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues Database. The sample includes Compustat firms, 
excluding utilities, financial firms, ADRs, tender-offers, and privately negotiated repurchases. Repurchasers (Rp_dummy=1) are 
defined as firms which repurchase at least 0.25% of its market value of equity in that specific fiscal year, and Non-repurchasers 
(Rp_dummy=0) if otherwise. Dollar repurchases for each fiscal year are computed as the yearly repurchase of common and 
preferred stocks (prstkc) less any decrease in preferred stock. Preferred stocks are measured as, in order of preference, redemption 
value (pstkr), liquidating value (pstkl), or carrying value (pstk). 
 
 Year 
N Repurchasers Percentage 
Non-
repurchasers 
Percentage 
1988 1,532 689 0.56 843 0.44 
1989 1,473 560 0.38 913 0.62 
1990 1,453 632 0.43 821 0.57 
1991 1,366 446 0.32 920 0.68 
1992 1,307 410 0.31 897 0.69 
1993 1,386 605 0.44 781 0.56 
1994 1,436 499 0.35 937 0.65 
1995 1,557 593 0.38 964 0.62 
1996 1,550 687 0.44 863 0.56 
1997 1,652 803 0.49 849 0.51 
1998 1,939 1,110 0.62 719 0.38 
1999 1,898 1,179 0.62 719 0.38 
2000 1,692 992 0.59 700 0.41 
2001 1,655 752 0.45 903 0.55 
2002 1,490 669 0.45 821 0.55 
2003 1,381 666 0.48 751 0.52 
2004 1,302 610 0.47 692 0.53 
2005 1,354 723 0.47 631 0.47 
2006 1,374 789 0.57 585 0.43 
2007 1,391 822 0.59 569 0.41 
2008 1,508 875 0.58 633 0.42 
2009 1,219 488 0.40 731 0.60 
2010 1,208 573 0.47 635 0.53 
2011 1,322 730 0.55 592 0.45 
 35,445 16,719 0.47 18,729 0.53 
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics. 
Dollar repurchases (mil.$) are the repurchase of common and preferred stocks (prstkc) less any decrease in preferred stock. 
Preferred stocks are measured as, in order of preference, redemption value (pstkr), liquidating value (pstkl), or carrying value (pstk). 
Rp_Percentage is Dollar repurchases at year t divided by market value of equity at year t-1. Rp_dummy takes on value of 1 when 
a firm repurchases at least 0.25% of its market value of equity and zero otherwise. Total_IPOs is the total number of IPOs that 
occur in the same three-digit SIC code industry in the previous six months of the current year. Adjusted_IPOs is Total IPOs 
divided by total number of firms in the same three-digit SIC code industry. Total_Proceeds is the sum of all IPO proceeds scaled 
by the sum of market value of all equity in the same three-digit SIC code industry. RIPO_E is the equally weighted first-day returns 
of all IPOs in the previous six months in the same three-digit SIC code industry. RIPO_P is proceeds weighted first-day returns of 
all IPOs in the previous six months in the same three-digit SIC code industry. High_IPOs, High_AdIPOs, High_Proceeds, 
High_RIPO_E and High_RIPO_P are all dummies and take on value of 1 when Total_IPOs, Adjusted_IPOs, Total_Proceeds, 
RIPO_E and RIPO_P are in their top 20 percentile and zero otherwise, respectively. Past_return is the firm’s market adjusted 
return as the return of the previous year minus the return of the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio. Dividend ratio is total dividends 
divided by the net income available to common stockholders. Size is logarithm of total assets of a firm. M/B is market value of 
stock divided by its book value. Debt/Equity is long-term debt divided by total equity. Operating income is operating income 
divided by total assets. Non-operating income is non-operating income divided by total assets. P/E is stock price divided by 
earnings per share at the end of fiscal year. Capital expenditures is capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Cash holdings 
is cash and equivalents (cheq) divided by total assets. Cash flows are computed as sales (saleq) minus cost of goods sold (cogsq) 
minus selling, general, and administrative expenses (xsgaq) minus the change in working capital. Concentration is computed 
based on the Herfindahl index, measured as sum of the squared market share of each firm in the same industry during a year.  
Variable N Mean Median SD P1 P99 
Repurchase variables       
Dollar repurchases (Mil.$) 35,445 99.669 1.176 628.458 0.000 1684.000 
Rp_Percentage 35,445 2.754 0.008 5.464 0.000 24.975 
Rp_dummy 35,445 0.471 1.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
 
IPO variables       
Total_IPOs 35,445 1.856 0.000 6.030 0.000 24.000 
Adjusted_IPOs 35,445 0.133 0.110 0.261 0.000 0.952 
Total_Proceeds 35,445 8.105 1.374 54.211 0.000 65.659 
RIPO_E 35,445 17.151 8.820 27.623 -11.428 116.244 
RIPO_P 35,445 17.937 9.627 29.850 -11.427 135.477 
 
IPO dummies       
High_IPOs 35,445 0.217 0.000 0.402 0.000 1.000 
High_AdIPOs 35,445 0.211 0.000 0.368 0.000 1.000 
High_Proceed 35,445 0.195 0.000 0.398 0.000 1.000 
High_RIPO_E 35,445 0.210 0.000 0.317 0.000 1.000 
High_RIPO_P 35,445 0.196 0.000 0.342 0.000 1.000 
 
Controls       
Past_return 35,445 0.056 -0.033 0.692 -0.866 2.231 
Dividend ratio 35,445 0.520 0.087 6.587 0.000 3.796 
Size 35,445 5.004 5.705 2.002 1.602 10.559 
M/B 35,445 4.403 1.962 19.836 0.374 17.711 
Debt/Equity 35,445 0.737 0.238 6.418 0.000 5.549 
Operating income 35,445 0.140 0.144 0.131 -0.306 0.433 
Non-operating income 35,445 0.011 0.006 0.026 -0.022 0.078 
P/E 35,445 22.966 15.761 114.31 -87.000 256.944 
Capital expenditures 35,445 0.062 0.045 0.064 0.001 0.315 
Cash holdings 35,445 0.152 0.076 0.182 0.000 0.785 
Cash flows 35,445 0.126 0.131 0.147 -0.297 0.471 
Concentration 35,445 0.252 0.196 0.205 0.044 1.000 
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Table 12: Univariate Tests. 
Repurchasers (Rp_dummy=1) are defined as firms which repurchase at least 0.25% of its market value of equity in that specific 
fiscal year and Non-repurchasers (Rp_dummy=0) if otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 2 and Appendix. 
 Repurchasers Non-repurchasers Difference 
 N Mean (1) N Mean (2) (1)-(2) t-stat. 
  
Repurchase variables       
Rp_ Percentage 16,719 5.623 18,729 0.193 5.430 4.36 
Dollar repurchases (Mil.$) 16,719 203.900 18,729 6.624 197.300 21.95 
       
IPO related variables       
Total_IPOs 16,719 1.990 18,729 1.736 0.254 7.50 
Adjusted_IPOs 16,719 0.143 18,729 0.125 0.017 8.11 
Total_Proceeds 16,719 8.250 18,729 7.971 0.279 5.23 
RIPO_E 16,719 18.440 18,729 15.930 2.500 4.18 
RIPO_P 16,719 19.410 18,729 16.540 2.880 4.59 
       
IPO Dummies       
High_IPOs 16,719 0.245 18,729 0.192 0.053 11.87 
High_AdIPOs 16,719 0.229 18,729 0.195 0.034 7.93 
High_Proceeds 16,719 0.219 18,729 0.175 0.044 4.78 
High_RIPO_E 16,719 0.277 18,729 0.151 0.126 4.69 
High_RIPO_P 16,719 0.251 18,729 0.147 0.104 9.13 
       
Controls       
Past_return 16,719 0.030 18,729 0.097 -0.067 -8.97 
Dividend ratio 16,719 0.371 18,729 0.694 -0.322 -2.08 
Size 16,719 4.215 18,729 5.708 -0.104 4.39 
M/B 16,719 3.827 18,729 4.917 -1.090 4.87 
Debt/Equity 16,719 0.785 18,729 0.661 0.124 0.89 
Operating income 16,719 0.142 18,729 0.136 0.007 4.23 
Non-operating income 16,719 0.011 18,729 0.010 0.001 2.97 
P/E 16,719 20.672 18,729 26.640 -5.968 -4.65 
Capital expenditures 16,719 0.059 18,729 0.066 -0.007 -9.09 
Cash holdings 16,719 0.167 18,729 0.127 0.040 18.56 
Cash flows 16,719 0.133 18,729 0.115 0.018 10.17 
Concentration 16,719 0.242 18,729 0.268 -0.027 -10.94 
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Table 13: Correlation Matrix of Measures for IPO Threat 
High_IPOs, High_AdIPOs, High_Proceeds, High_RIPO_E and High_RIPO_P are all dummies and take on a value of 1 when 
Total_IPOs, Adjusted_IPOs, Total_Proceeds, RIPO_E, and RIPO_P are in their top 20th percentile and zero otherwise, 
respectively. Total_IPOs is the total number of IPOs that occur in the same three-digit SIC code industry in the previous six months 
of the current year. Adjusted_IPOs is Total IPOs divided by total number of firms in the same three-digit SIC code industry. 
Total_Proceeds is sum of all IPO proceeds scaled by sum of market value of all equity in the same three-digit SIC code industry. 
RIPO_E is the equally weighted first-day returns of all IPOs in the previous six months in the same three-digit SIC code industry. 
RIPO_P is the proceeds weighted first-day returns of all IPOs in the previous six months in the same three-digit SIC code industry 
 High_IPOs High_AdIPOs High_Proceeds High_RIPO_E High_RIPO_P 
High_IPOs 1 
    
    
High_AdIPOs 
0.613 
1 
   
[0.000]    
High_Proceeds 
0.600 0.790 
1 
  
[0.000] [0.000]   
High_RIPO_E 
0.561 0.528 0.500 
1 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  
High_RIPO_P 
0.570 0.527 0.494 0.936 
1 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
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Table 14: Decision to Repurchase: Tobit Regressions 
This table reports the marginal effects of tobit models. All continuous regressors are standardized to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one.The dependent variable is Rp_Percentaget, which equals the dollar repurchases at year t divided by 
market value of stocks at year t-1. IPO_threat is measured by different proxies including High_IPOs, High_AdIPOs, 
High_Proceeds, High_RIPO_E and High_RIPO_P which are dummy variables and take on a value of 1 when Total_IPOs, 
Adjusted_IPOs, Total_Proceeds, RIPO_E and RIPO_P are in their top 20th percentile and zero otherwise, respectively. 
Past_return is the firm’s market adjusted return, equal to the return of the previous year minus the return of the CRSP equally-
weighted portfolio for that year (Dittmar, 2000). Dividend ratio is total dividends divided by the net income available to common 
stockholders. Size is logarithm of total assets of the firm. M/B is equal to market value of stock divided by its book value. 
Debt/Equity is equal to long-term debt divided by total equity. Operating income is equal to operating income divided by total 
assets. Non-operating income is equal to non-operating income divided by total assets. P/E is equal to stock price divided by 
earnings per share at the end of fiscal year. Capital expenditures is equal to capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Dollar 
repurchases, Cash flows and Concentration are described in the Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for clustering by firms 
and in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
  High_IPOs High_AdIPOs High_Proceeds High_RIPO_E High_RIPO_P 
IPO_threat 0.5180a 0.5086a 0.4162a 0.5280a 0.6237a 
 [0.124] [0.1305] [0.1219] [0.1425] [0.1413] 
      
Past_return -0.2840a -0.2783a -0.2750a -0.2714a -0.2717a 
 [0.0474] [0.0474] [0.0471] [0.0478] [0.0476] 
Size -0.1710a -0.1662a -0.1007a -0.1042a -0.1012a 
 [0.0263] [0.0251] [0.0391] [0.0395] [0.0344] 
M/B -0.1220a -0.1210a -0.1253a -0.1282a -0.1285a 
 [0.0510] [0.0601] [0.0701] [0.0613] [0.0635] 
Dividend ratio -0.0953a -0.0496c -0.0495c -0.498c -0.0501c 
 [0.0297] [0.0292] [0.0299] [0.0299] [0.0281] 
Debt/Equity -0.0604 -0.0189 -0.0013 -0.0046 -0.0011 
 [0.1691] [0.1699] [0.0014] [0.0033] [0.0024] 
P/E -0.0022a -0.0041a -0.0040a -0.0024a -0.0027a 
 [0.0004] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.0001] 
Non-operating income 0.1170b 0.1177b 0.1223a 0.1361a 0.1823a 
 [0.0523] [0.0520] [0.0514] [0.0314] [0.0316] 
Operating income 0.8342a 0.8351a 0.7451a 0.8051a 0.8817a 
 [ 0.0839] [0.0814] [0.0648] [0.0621] [0.0625] 
Capital expenditures -0.7235a -0.721a -0.7319a -0.7751a -0.7212a 
 [0.0658] [0.0615] [0.0627] [0.0515] [0.0812] 
Cash holdings 0.4235a 0.4782a 0.5138a 0.5718a 0.5163a 
 [0.0411] [0.0413] [0.0412] [0.0432] [0.0414] 
Cash flows 0.7621a 0.666a 0.6246a 0.6452a 0.6133a 
 [0.0559] [0.0511] [0.0514] [0.0519] [0.0545] 
Intercept 0.8238a 0.8195a 0.9522a 0.9732a 0.9568a 
 [0.1923] [0.2179] [0.3455] [0.3002] [0.3090] 
Industry and year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo-R squared 0.0412 0.0532 0.0487 0.0417 0.0485 
N 35,445 35,445 35,445 35,445 35,445 
 67 
 
Table 15: Decision to Repurchase-Tobit Regressions with Interaction Variables 
This table reports the marginal effects of tobit models. The dependent variable is Rp_Percentaget, which is equal to the dollar 
repurchases at year t divided by market value of stocks at year t-1. IPO_threat is measured by different proxies including 
High_IPOs, High_AdIPOs, High_Proceeds, High_RIPO_E and High_RIPO_P which are dummy variables and take on value of 1 
when Total_IPOs, Adjusted_IPOs, Total_Proceeds, RIPO_E and RIPO_P are in their top 20 percentile and zero otherwise, 
respectively. Past_return is the firm’s market adjusted return which is equal to the return of the previous year minus the return of 
the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio for that year (Dittmar (2000)). Dividend ratio is total dividends divided by the net income 
available to common stockholders. Size is logarithm of total assets of the firm. M/B is equal to market value of stock divided by 
its book value. Debt/Equity is equal to long-term debt divided by total equity. Operating income is equal to operating income 
divided by total assets. Non-operating income is equal to non-operating income divided by total assets. P/E is equal to stock price 
divided by earnings per share at the end of fiscal year. Capital expenditures is equal to capital expenditure divided by the total 
assets. Dollar repurchases, Cash flows and Concentration are described in the Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for 
clustering by firms and in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
  High_IPOs High_AdIPOs. High_Proceeds High_RIPO_E High_RIPO_P 
IPO_threat 0.4583a 0.4527a 0.3814a 0.4252a 0.4712a 
 [0.1185] [0.1328] [0.1239] [0.1312] [0.1397] 
IPO_threatcConcentration 0.1324b 0.1474c 0.1352c 0.1359c 0.1334c 
 [0.0612] [0.0755] [0.0801] [0.0813] [0.0816] 
IPO_threatcPast_return -0.2131a -0.2415a -0.2316a -0.2273b -0.2315b 
 [0.0714] [0.0798] [0.0802] [0.1143] [0.1141] 
Concentration -0.2515a -0.3741a -0.3232a -0.3225a -0.3561a 
 [0.0495] [0.0495] [0.0496] [0.0476] [0.0495] 
Past_return -0.2254a -0.2183a -0.2150a -0.2314a -0.2317a 
 [0.0531] [0.0474] [0.0471] [0.0478] [0.0476] 
Size -0.1651a -0.1612a -0.1009a -0.1042a -0.1022a 
 [0.0263] [0.0271] [0.0381] [0.0313] [0.0347] 
M/B -0.1220a -0.1210a -0.1253a -0.1272a -0.1286a 
 [0.051] [0.061] [0.070] [0.061] [0.061] 
Dividend ratio -0.0957a -0.0486c -0.0148 -0.0478 -0.0510c 
 [0.0297] [0.0291] [0.0297] [0.0295] [0.0283] 
Debt/Equity -0.0611 -0.0180 -0.0011 -0.0046 -0.0013 
 [0.1690] [0.1690] [0.0013] [0.0034] [0.0023] 
P/E -0.0021a -0.0042a -0.0043a -0.0024a -0.0027a 
 [0.0004] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Non-operating income 0.1171b 0.1175b 0.1214a 0.1360a 0.1822a 
 [0.0533] [0.0540] [0.0514] [0.0313] [0.0315] 
Operating income 0.8345a 0.8352a 0.7452a 0.8052a 0.8819a 
 [ 0.0840] [0.0824] [0.0648] [0.0631] [0.0627] 
Capital expenditures -0.7237a -0.719a -0.7320a -0.7755a -0.7222a 
 [0.0658] [0.0616] [0.0625] [0.0614] [0.0611] 
Cash holdings 0.4237a 0.4785a 0.5141a 0.5721a 0.5166a 
 [0.0410] [0.0411] [0.0410] [0.0430] [0.0412] 
Cash flows 0.7622a 0.667a 0.6231a 0.6451a 0.6131a 
 [0.0560] [0.0511] [0.0512] [0.0520] [0.0542] 
Intercept 0.8258a 0.8175a 0.9523a 0.9712a 0.9588a 
 [0.1923] [0.2179] [0.3455] [0.3005] [0.3091] 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo-R squared 0.0417 0.0522 0.0466 0.0447 0.0495 
N 35,445 35,445 35,445 35,445 35,445 
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Table 16: Decision to Repurchase-Probit Regressions 
This Table reports the marginal effects of probit models. All continuous regressors are standardized to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. The dependent variable is Rp_dummy, which takes on a value of 1 when a firm repurchases at least 
0.25% of its market value of equity and zero otherwise. IPO_threat is measured by different proxies including High_IPOs, 
High_AdIPOs, High_Proceeds, High_RIPO_E and High_RIPO_P which are dummy variables and take on value of 1 when 
Total_IPOs, Adjusted_IPOs, Total_Proceeds, RIPO_E and RIPO_P are in their top 20 percentile and zero otherwise, respectively. 
Past_return is the firm’s market adjusted return which is equal to the return of the previous year minus the return of the CRSP 
equally-weighted portfolio for that year (Dittmar (2000)). Dividend ratio is total dividends divided by the net income available to 
common stockholders. Size is logarithm of total assets of the firm. M/B is equal to market value of stock divided by its book value. 
Debt/Equity is equal to long-term debt divided by total equity. Operating income is equal to operating income divided by total 
assets. Non-operating income is equal to non-operating income divided by total assets. P/E is equal to stock price divided by 
earnings per share at the end of fiscal year. Capital expenditures is equal to capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Dollar 
repurchases, Cash flows and Concentration are described in the Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for clustering by firms 
and in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  High_IPOs High_AdIPOs High_Proceeds High_RIPO_E High_RIPO_P 
IPO_threat 0.0776a 0.0781a 0.0524b 0.0593a 0.0546a 
 [0.0214] [0.0211] [0.0216] [0.0225] [0.0205] 
      
Past_return -0.0489a -0.0488a -0.0486a -0.0482a -0.0488a 
 [0.0085] [0.0084] [0.0084] [0.0085] [0.0085] 
Size -0.0547a -0.0541a -0.0546a -0.0546a -0.0543a 
 [0.0091] [0.0090] [0.0094] [0.0094] [0.0094] 
M/B -0.0356c 0.0359c 0.0359c 0.0357c 0.0357c 
 [0.0195] [0.0196] [0.0195] [0.0195] [0.0195] 
Dividend ratio -0.0230a -0.0231a -0.0230a -0.0230a -0.0230a 
 [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] 
Debt/Equity 0.0493 0.0493 0.0492 0.0492 0.0492 
 [0.0330] [0.0330] [0.0331] [0.0332] [0.0331] 
P/E -0.0779a -0.0778a -0.0775a -0.0776a -0.0776a 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Non-operating 
income 
0.0331a 0.0329a 0.0323a 0.0333a 0.0333a 
 [0.0098] [0.0098] [0.0095] [0.0097] [0.0096] 
Operating income 0.0343a 0.0343a 0.0342a 0.0344a 0.0344a 
 [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0017] 
Capital expenditures -0.0923a -0.0923a -0.0923a -0.0927a -0.0927a 
 [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0034] 
Cash holdings 0.0649a 0.0649a 0.0649a 0.0649a 0.0649a 
 [0.0073] [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0073] [0.0073] 
Cash flows 0.0927a 0.0927a 0.0927a 0.0927a 0.0927a 
 [0.0094] [0.0094] [0.0091] [0.0092] [0.0092] 
Intercept 0.4443 0.4443 0.4444 0.4443 0.4444 
 [0.2821] [0.2823] [0.2822] [0.2821] [0.2822] 
Industry and year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo-R squared 0.044 0.0557 0.0457 0.0457 0.0485 
N 35,445 35,445 35,445 35,445 35,445 
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Table 17: Decision to Repurchase: Probit Regressions with Interaction Variables 
The dependent variable is Rp_dummy, which takes on a value of 1 when a firm repurchases at least 0.25% of its market value 
of equity and zero otherwise. IPO_threat is measured by different proxies including High_IPOs, High_AdIPOs, High_Proceeds, 
High_RIPO_E and High_RIPO_P which are dummy variables and take on value of 1 when Total_IPOs, Adjusted_IPOs, 
Total_Proceeds, RIPO_E and RIPO_P are in their top 20 percentile and zero otherwise, respectively. Dividend ratio is total 
dividends divided by the net income available to common stockholders. Size is logarithm of total assets of the firm. M/B is equal 
to market value of stock divided by its book value. Debt/Equity is equal to long-term debt divided by total equity. Operating 
income is equal to operating income divided by total assets. Non-operating income is equal to non-operating income divided by 
total assets. P/E is equal to stock price divided by earnings per share at the end of fiscal year. Capital expenditures is equal to 
capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Standard errors are corrected for clustering by firms and in parentheses. a, b, c denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
  High_IPOs High_AdIPOs High_Proceeds High_RIPO_E High_RIPO_P 
IPO_threat 0.0525a 0.0511a 0.0412b 0.0453b 0.0466b 
 [0.0173] [0.0181] [0.0210] [0.0205] [0.0205] 
IPO_threatcConcentration 0.0480a 0.0378a 0.0199c 0.0284c 0.0274c 
 [0.0203] [0.0119] [0.0105] [0.0158] [0.0158] 
IPO_threatcPast_return -0.0753a -0.0352b -0.0621a -0.0438a -0.0687a 
 [0.0242] [0.0187] [0.0178] [0.0094] [0.0178] 
      
Concentration -0.0419a -0.0419a -0.0421a -0.0419a -0.0419a 
 [0.0094] [0.0094] [0.0095] [0.0093] [0.0093] 
Past return -0.0485a -0.0485a -0.0487a -0.0483a -0.0483a 
 [0.0085] [0.0085] [0.0086] [0.0085] [0.0085] 
Size -0.0547a -0.0542a -0.0547a -0.0546a -0.0544a 
 [0.0091] [0.0091] [0.0093] [0.0094] [0.0093] 
M/B -0.0357c 0.0355c 0.0358c 0.0357c 0.0356c 
 [0.0195] [0.0196] [0.0194] [0.0193] [0.0193] 
Dividend ratio -0.0233a -0.0230a -0.0232a -0.0235a -0.0235a 
 [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] 
Debt/Equity 0.0491 0.0491 0.0492 0.0492 0.0492 
 [0.0331] [0.0331] [0.0331] [0.0331] [0.0331] 
P/E -0.0780a -0.0776a -0.0775a -0.0776a -0.0776a 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Non-operating income 0.0332a 0.0331a 0.0324a 0.0333a 0.0334a 
 [0.0097] [0.0097] [0.0096] [0.0097] [0.0097] 
Operating income 0.0345a 0.0345a 0.0342a 0.0344a 0.0343a 
 [0.0017] [0.0019] [0.0014] [0.0017] [0.0017] 
Capital expenditures -0.0921a -0.0923a -0.0921a -0.0929a -0.0928a 
 [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0034] 
Cash holdings 0.0647a 0.0646a 0.0645a 0.0649a 0.0649a 
 [0.0072] [0.0072] [0.0071] [0.0072] [0.0072] 
Cash flows 0.0926a 0.0926a 0.0927a 0.0927a 0.0927a 
 [0.0093] [0.0093] [0.0091] [0.0093] [0.0092] 
Intercept 0.4447 0.4447 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 
 [0.2822] [0.2823] [0.2822] [0.2822] [0.2822] 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo-R squared 0.044 0.0557 0.0467 0.0487 0.0485 
N 35,445 35,445 35,445 35,445 35,445 
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Table 18: The Repurchase Decision: Controlling for Economic Conditions 
This table reports the marginal effects of tobit models using only High_IPOs as a measure for IPOs competitive threats. All 
continuous regressors are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The dependent variable is 
Rp_Percentaget, whichequals the dollar repurchases at year t divided by market value of stocks at year t-1. IPO_threat is measured 
by different proxies including High_IPOs, High_AdIPOs, High_Proceeds, High_RIPO_E and High_RIPO_P which are dummy 
variables and take on value of 1 when Total_IPOs, Adjusted_IPOs, Total_Proceeds, RIPO_E and RIPO_P are in their top 20th 
percentile and zero otherwise, respectively. Past_return is the firm’s market adjusted return which is equal to the return of the 
previous year minus the return of the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio for that year (Dittmar (2000)). Dividend ratio is total 
dividends divided by the net income available to common stockholders. Size is logarithm of total assets of the firm. M/B is equal 
to market value of stock divided by its book value. Debt/Equity is equal to long-term debt divided by total equity. Operating 
income is equal to operating income divided by total assets. Non-operating income is equal to non-operating income divided by 
total assets. P/E is equal to stock price divided by earnings per share at the end of fiscal year. Capital expenditures is equal to 
capital expenditure divided by the total assets. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defined recessionary economies as 
in July 1981 –Nov 1982, July 1990 –Mar 1991, March 2001–Nov 2001, and Dec 2007 – June 2009. Internet bubble years are 1999 
and 2000. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 Economic Recession Economic Expansion Without Bubble Years 
High_IPOs 0.4814b 0.4412b 0.5214a 0.4621a 0.5113a 0.4611a 
 [0.2283] [0.2250] [0.1104] [0.1105] [0.1224] [0.1126] 
High_IPOscConcentration  0.0960a  0.1113c  0.1301b 
  [0.0371]  [0.0611]  [0.0613] 
High_IPOscPast_return  -0.1315c  -0.2012a  -0.2441a 
  [0.0713]  [0.0728]  [0.0745] 
Concentration  -0.2113a  -0.2523a  -0.2601a 
  [0.0456]  [0.0485]  [0.0414] 
Past_return -0.2601a -0.2311a -0.2932a -0.2110a -0.2834a -0.2251a 
 [0.0421] [0.0422] [0.0593] [0.0524] [0.0469] [0.0532] 
Size -0.1510a -0.1530a -0.1810a -0.1810a -0.1771a -0.1713a 
 [0.0265] [0.0263] [0.0203] [0.0202] [0.0267] [0.0264] 
M/B -0.1310a -0.1310a -0.1171a -0.1175a -0.1221a -0.1220a 
 [0.048] [0.047] [0.053] [0.049] [0.049] [0.051] 
Dividend ratio -0.0976a -0.0978a -0.1230a -0.1170a -0.0961a -0.0956a 
 [0.0295] [0.0295] [0.0297] [0.0296] [0.0295] [0.0299] 
Debt/Equity -0.0502 -0.0505 -0.0852 -0.0853 -0.0612 -0.0611 
 [0.1823] [0.1816] [0.1722] [0.1721] [0.1690] [0.1692] 
P/E -0.0045a -0.0045a -0.0018a -0.0018a -0.0021a -0.0021a 
 [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Non-operating income 0.1032b 0.1033b 0.1214b 0.1214b 0.1171b 0.1170b 
 [0.0523] [0.0524] [0.0523] [0.0525] [0.0524] [0.0532] 
Operating income 0.5188a 0.5191a 0.8712a 0.8712a 0.8339a 0.8346a 
 [ 0.0845] [ 0.0823] [ 0.0861] [ 0.0857] [ 0.0837] [ 0.0841] 
Capital expenditures -0.6651a -0.6650a -0.8110a -0.8111a -0.7235a -0.7240a 
 [0.0847] [0.0845] [0.0758] [0.0758] [0.0655] [0.0657] 
Cash holdings 0.3772a 0.3768a 0.4621a 0.4622a 0.4232a 0.4233a 
 [0.0445] [0.0440] [0.0403] [0.0402] [0.0413] [0.0411] 
Cash flows 0.7621a 0.7611a 0.7621a 0.7620a 0.7623a 0.7622a 
 [0.0759] [0.0745] [0.0563] [0.0562] [0.0557] [0.0561] 
Intercept 1.1142a 1.1108a 0.7255a 0.7257a 0.8237a 0.8236a 
 [0.2366] [0.2322] [0.1542] [0.1544] [0.1920] [0.1922] 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo-R squared 0.0412 0.0412 0.0488 0.0488 0.0488 0.0488 
N 6,627 6,627 28,818 28,818 29,449 29,449 
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Table 19: Probability of Repurchase: Controlling for Economic Conditions 
The dependent variable is Rp_dummy, which takes on a value of 1 when a firm repurchases at least 0.25% of its market value 
of equity and zero otherwise. IPO_threat is measured by different proxies including High_IPOs, High_AdIPOs, High_Proceeds, 
High_RIPO_E and High_RIPO_P which are dummy variables and take on value of 1 when Total_IPOs, Adjusted_IPOs, 
Total_Proceeds, RIPO_E and RIPO_P are in their top 20 percentile and zero otherwise, respectively. Past_return is the firm’s 
market adjusted return which is equal to the return of the previous year minus the return of the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio 
for that year (Dittmar (2000)). Dividend ratio is total dividends divided by the net income available to common stockholders. Size 
is logarithm of total assets of the firm. M/B is equal to market value of stock divided by its book value. Debt/Equity is equal to 
long-term debt divided by total equity. Operating income is equal to operating income divided by total assets. Non-operating 
income is equal to non-operating income divided by total assets. P/E is equal to stock price divided by earnings per share at the 
end of fiscal year. Capital expenditures is equal to capital expenditure divided by the total assets. National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) defined recessionary economies as in July 1981 –Nov 1982, July 1990 –Mar 1991, March 2001–Nov 2001, and 
Dec 2007 – June 2009. Internet bubble years are 1999 and 2000. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are corrected for clustering by firms and in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 Economic recession Economic expansion Without Bubble Years 
High_IPOs 0.0522b 0.0311c 0.0781a 0.0652a 0.0713a 0.0518a 
 [0.0244] [0.0184] [0.0212] [0.0166] [0.0215] [0.0163] 
High_IPOscConcentration 0.0412b  0.0487a  0.0465a 
  [0.0208]  [0.0201]  [0.0207] 
High_IPOscPast_return -0.0551b  -0.0771a  -0.0615a 
  [0.0246]  [0.0236]  [0.0232] 
Concentration -0.0338a  -0.0474a  -0.0433a 
  [0.0065]  [0.0099]  [0.0091] 
Past_return -0.0461a -0.0421a -0.0501a -0.0491a -0.0490a -0.0455a 
 [0.0085] [0.0094] [0.0085] [0.0082] [0.0085] [0.0071] 
Size -0.0512a -0.0501a -0.0581a -0.0561a -0.0547a -0.0547a 
 [0.0075] [0.0112] [0.0098] [0.0091] [0.0093] [0.0091] 
M/B -0.0311c -0.0322 -0.0372c -0.0388c -0.0355c -0.0351c 
 [0.0163] [0.0205] [0.0199] [0.0197] [0.0193] [0.0194] 
Dividend ratio -0.0221a -0.0218a -0.0214a -0.0210a -0.0209a -0.0201a 
 [0.0009] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
Debt/Equity 0.0322 0.0472 0.0475 0.0496 0.0471 0.0492 
 [0.0345] [0.0521] [0.0341] [0.0329] [0.0331] [0.0331] 
P/E -0.0611a -0.0613a -0.0791a -0.0791a -0.0783a -0.0781a 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Non-operating income 0.0300a 0.0222b 0.0366a 0.0475a 0.0329a 0.0365a 
 [0.0081] [0.0105] [0.0097] [0.0089] [0.0098] [0.0096] 
Operating income 0.0317a 0.0315a 0.0364a 0.0373a 0.0341a 0.0342a 
 [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0021] [0.0019] [0.0020] [0.0019] 
Capital expenditures -0.0715a -0.0772a -0.0977a -0.0974a -0.0926a -0.0923a 
 [0.0052] [0.0054] [0.0022] [0.0029] [0.0035] [0.0035] 
Cash holdings 0.0511a 0.0551a 0.0687a 0.0727a 0.0655a 0.0627a 
 [0.0052] [0.0072] [0.0070] [0.0071] [0.0072] [0.0072] 
Cash flows 0.0718a 0.0658a 0.0966a 0.0994a 0.0941a 0.0974a 
 [0.0065] [0.0066] [0.0095] [0.0091] [0.0092] [0.0091] 
Intercept 0.4102 0.421 0.4451 0.4625 0.4452 0.4427 
 [0.2011] [0.2712] [0.2917] [0.2852] [0.2817] [0.2819] 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo-R squared 0.0412 0.0412 0.0488 0.0488 0.0488 0.0488 
N 6,627 6,627 28,818 28,818 29,449 29,449 
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Appendix B: Variable Description: 
Repurchase Variables: 
Dollar repurchases (mil.$): The repurchase of common and preferred stocks (prstkc) less any 
decrease in preferred stock. Preferred stocks are measured as, in order of preference, redemtion 
value (pstkr), liquidating value (pstkl), or carrying value (pstk). 
Percent repurchases: Dollar repurchases at year t divided by market value of stocks at year t-1.  
Repurchase dummy: Dummy variable takes on value of 1 when a firm repurchases at least 1% 
of its value (percent repurchases>=1) and zero otherwise 
Total payout (mil.$): Sum of repurchases and dividends 
Repurchases/Total payout: Dollar repurchases divided by Total payout 
IPO Related Variables: 
Total_IPOs: The total numbers of IPOs that occur in the same three-digit SIC code industry in 
the previous six months of the current year. 
IPOs_Pct: Total IPOs divided by total number of firms in the same three-digit SIC code industry 
Total_Proceed_Pct: Total IPO proceeds divided by the total of market value of stocks in the 
same three-digit SIC code industry. Total IPO proceeds is sum of proceeds of IPOs that occur in 
the same three-digit SIC code industry in the previous six months of the current year.  
RIPO_E: Equally weighted first-day returns 
RIPO_P: Proceeds weighted first-day returns  
High_IPOs: Dummy variable takes on value of 1 when Total_IPOs is on its top 20th percentile 
and zero otherwise. 
High_IPOs_Pct.: Dummy variable takes on value of 1 when IPOs_Pct is on its top 20th 
percentile and zero otherwise. 
High_Proceed_Pct.: Dummy variable takes on value of 1 when Total_Proceed_Pct is on its top 
20th percentile and zero otherwise. 
High_RIPO_E: Dummy variable takes on value of 1 when RIPO_E is greater than mean value, 
and zero otherwise. 
High_RIPO_P: Dummy variable takes on value of 1 when RIPO_P is greater than mean value, 
and zero otherwise. 
Control Variables: 
Past return: The compounded monthly return for the previous year 
Dividend ratio: Total dividends divided by the net income available to common stockholders 
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Size: The logarithm of the total assets of the firms  
M/B: Market value of stock divided by its book value  
Market value (mil.$): Market value of stock at the end of the fiscal year 
Debt/Equity: Long-term debt divided by total equity  
Operating income: Operating income divided by total assets  
Non-operating income: Non-operating income divided by total assets 
P/E: Stock price divided by earnings per share at the end of fiscal year 
Capital expenditures: Capital expenditure divided by the total assets  
Cash holdings: Cash and equivalents (cheq) divided by total assets 
Cashflows: Cashflow is computed as sales (saleq) minus cost of goods sold (cogsq) minus 
selling, general, and administrative expenses (xsgaq) minus the change in working capital. 
Working capital is defined as accounts receivable (rectq) plus inventory (invtq) plus other 
current assets (acoq) minus the sum of accounts payable, income taxes payable (txpq), and other 
current liabilities (lcoq). Selling, general, and administrative expenses are decreased by one-
quarter of the annual value of research and development (xrd) and advertising expenses (xad), 
when available. 
Concentration: Based on Herfindahl index which is measured as sum of the squared market 
share of each firm in the same industry during a year. Market share is defined as the total sales of 
the firm in a given year divided by the total sales of the industry in the year. The industry is 
defined at the three digit SIC code (SICCD) level. Sales are measured as moving average over 
the past three years. 
 
 
 
